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FAMILY MATTERS: HOW CONCERNS FOR YOUNGER RELATIVES BRIDGE GENERATIONAL DIVIDES

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Finally, this report is dedicated to the memory of Jim Grant (1958 – 2023), a lifelong champion for improving young people's access to high quality further education and training.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This new report, *Family Matters: How concerns for younger relatives bridge generational divides*, investigates people's attitudes towards intergenerational inequalities in economic wellbeing, as well as public policies that might help to reduce them. The authors place a special emphasis on the opinions of middle-aged (40-59) and older (60+) Britons, who make up an ever-growing proportion of the national electorate. It shows who, within these older groups, is sympathetic to the difficulties facing younger adults and supports state investment in them. This sympathy and support is shown to derive from family ties which motivate older adults to support policies that benefit younger generations, and punish parties whose policies do not.

Our report draws upon data from an original survey, 'Intergenpol-GB', of 6,021 adults (including over 4,000 aged 40 and above). Using innovative survey questions about family members, the wellbeing of different age groups, and specific policy proposals, we develop a series of arguments regarding the role of family ties in people's policy preferences and electoral choices in modern Britain. This research was funded by a British Academy Innovation Grant, and was designed by the Nuffield Politics Research Centre, Nuffield College, Oxford. It was fielded by YouGov in August 2022. It is, to the best of our knowledge, the first in-depth inter-generationally focused political survey of its kind.

Previous research by the Resolution Foundation revealed that young people today are struggling to match lifecycle milestones that earlier generations enjoyed, such as a secure job and a home that they own. Evidence suggests that it is young adults who are most likely to be struggling to pay their bills during the ongoing cost of living crisis. Recent polling indicates that, in contrast to the 2010s, voters' main concerns increasingly revolve around economic issues rather than cultural ones. Our report therefore provides a timely investigation of how economic precarity experienced by the younger generation might start to have a greater impact on British politics.

Our findings question a simple assumption that age groups have diametrically opposing economic interests, or that the growing segment of older voters would oppose efforts to improve the outcomes of younger generations. We investigate several important areas of interest including; peoples' perceptions of intergenerational inequality; the number of people that have relatives who are struggling financially and the impact of these family connections; how people with struggling relatives think about different government policies; and how the voting intention of people with struggling relatives is different.

We found that 17% of the electorate – equivalent to nearly 8 million potential voters – are both over-forty and have young adult relatives that are struggling financially. This 'hidden electorate' is at risk of being overlooked despite being, by comparison, roughly twice the size of the total population of the 'Red Wall'. [1] We suggest that both major political parties might appeal to these newly identified 'family fortunes voters' by promising to improve the financial wellbeing of their loved ones. This offers a way to avoid seeing politics and electoral appeals as a zero-sum game between different age-groups. Rather, older voters may support parties who also offer greater support to their younger family members, and parties could appeal across the age distribution by considering the role of family ties in people's policy preferences and electoral choices.

Our research reveals some important new insights into public opinion on Britain's economic generational disparities (as of August 2022):

- Over half of under 40s (51%) believe that they will have worse living standards over their lifetimes than their parents.
- 59% of adults aged 40-59, and 45% of adults over 60, believe that current younger generations are *worse-off* financially than both middle-aged (40-59) and older (60+) adults.
- Around one in four people aged 40 and over (24%), including one in five people over 60 (19%), have close relatives in their twenties and thirties that they think are struggling financially, a higher rate than have struggling family members

[1] The ONS (2021c) estimate that the 42 parliamentary constituencies in the English north and midlands that were identified as part of the Red Wall by James Kangasooriam (Kangasoorium and Simon 2021) had a combined population of 4.1 million, as of mid-2020.

aged 40-59 (15%) or 60+ (15%).

- Almost one in three people aged 40-59 (32%) and 60+ (31%) thought it likely that they themselves would need to give significant financial or practical support to their younger family members within the next decade.
- Majorities of those aged 60 and over support increased spending on policies aimed at young adults (even at the cost of higher taxes) with more free vocational education (65% support) and local affordable housing (61% support) being most popular. Support is similarly strong among those aged 40-59 (60% and 56%, respectively).
- Among adults aged 60 and over with younger family members that are struggling financially, support for spending on vocational education and increasing affordable housing locally is 9 percentage points higher than average for their age group. Similar results are found for middle-aged people, as well as for other policies such as free childcare.
- Older adults with financially struggling younger family members are 13 percentage points less likely to support the Conservatives, and 9 percentage points more likely to support Labour, than the average person of their age. For those in their forties and fifties these gaps are 7 and 5 percentage points, respectively.
- Differences in support for policies and parties between those with better or worse off younger relatives cannot be explained by differences in the financial wellbeing of these older and middle-aged adults themselves.

These new insights are useful for bridging oft-cited generational divides in British politics and society, and ultimately provide part of the answer to moving towards a greater generational consensus in dealing with Britain's age-based disparities. The mostly small divisions between old and young on attitudes to spending on housing, childcare, and education might help to explain why other researchers have generally found that the generations are more divided on questions of culture and identity than on classic 'left-right' economic issues of tax and spending.

Most importantly, our findings should give pause to any policy-maker or politician concluding that generations will only support and vote for policies that are in their age-specific self-interest. Through a combination of family connection, concern and heightened awareness for younger family members' economic experiences, sizeable proportions of the older generations are aware of intergenerational economic disparities and are motivated to support policies that do something about them. A substantial minority of older voters may well be motivated in the next general election to support parties and policies that help out the young.

Section 1: Intergenerational inequality in modern Britain

In Britain, a person's year of birth has long been a reliable predictor of their likely level of financial security. Over the past few decades, however, the distribution of wealth has seen a significant shift. In an inversion of twentieth century norms, when pension-age was a byword for poverty risk, it is older adults who are now, on average, the disproportionately well off.

Figures 1 and 2 present a snapshot of the Resolution Foundation's analysis of changes in the distribution of wealth and property between the generations during the last few decades. The share of total household wealth held by those aged 60 and above has risen from 42 per cent in 2006-08 to 51 per cent in 2018-20, whilst the share going to those under 40 has declined from 10 to 8 per cent (**Figure 1**). This change is partly driven by demographics (e.g. more sexagenarians in the population), but it does not explain the full shift. A bigger contributing factor appears to be that younger age cohorts are accumulating wealth at a slower pace than older age groups were at the same age (Broome et al 2022: 56). This is most evident with regard to declining opportunities for Millennial and 'Gen Z' Britons to acquire a stake in the property market (**Figure 2**). Around half of all family units headed by 30-year-olds in the 1976-1980 (50%) and 1996-2000 (48%) periods owned their own home. However, by 2016-2020, the homeownership rate among this cohort had fallen to just 30%. By contrast, the homeownership rate amongst fifty-year-olds actually increased between 1976-80 (52%) and 1996-2000 (75%) before falling less dramatically (to 63%) by 2016-2020. Most striking, however, is the rise of home owning pension-age adults. In 1976-1980, the homeownership rate amongst 70-year-olds was below that of 30-year-olds (45% v 50%). Homeownership among this older group increased considerably by 1996-2000 (68%) and, conversely for 30- and 50-year-olds, was even higher by 2016-2020 (77%).[2] Whilst today's young adults have less wealth and property than their predecessors did in the late-twentieth and early-twenty-first century, today's cohort of older adults have considerably more.

[2] See Broome et al (2022: 76) for a more detailed cohort analysis of trends in home ownership. The same authors also estimate that, since 2015, Britons aged 65+ have had home ownership rates around seven times greater than adults under thirty (Broome et al 2022: 71).

Figure 1: *The Share of Britain's Total Household Wealth Owned by Different Age Cohorts in 2006-08 and 2018-20*



Source: Resolution Foundation analysis of Office for National Statistics (ONS), Wealth and Assets Survey. See Broome et al (2022: 56).

Note: The figure shows the percentage share of total household wealth in Great Britain possessed by different age cohorts both in 2006-08 and 2018-20. Overall, the share of household wealth owned by adults aged under-40 has declined from 11% to 8%. Middle-aged (40-59) adults' share has declined from 47% to 41%. Older (60+) adults' share has, however, increased from 41% to 51%.

The relative lack of capital available to today's cohort of young adults, in addition to a general post-financial crisis stagnation in wage growth and the resultant inability to save significant amounts of money, has left them heavily exposed to economic shocks. Between 2018 and 2020, only around half of young adults under-40 said that they could meet an unexpected major expense through their own savings, investment and current accounts, as opposed to over 80% of adults over-65 (Broome et al. 2022: 35). This has had ramifications for how well they have been able to cope during the current cost of living crisis. By November 2022, around 1-in-3 adults in their twenties and thirties said they had 'tried to cut back a lot' on their overall spending in the recent months, as opposed to fewer than 1-in-5 pensioners (Brewer, Fry, and Try 2023: 25). Young people were also more likely to have fallen behind on priority bills, with 20 per cent of 18-24-year-olds behind on at least one bill between December 2022 and March 2023, compared to only 3 per cent of 65-74-year-olds (Broome, Handscomb, and Try 2023: 29).

Figure 2: Homeownership Rates by Different Age Cohorts in Different Periods



Source: Adaption of Resolution Foundation analysis of data from Institute for Fiscal Studies, Households Below Average Income (1961-83); ONS, Annual Labour Force Survey (1984-1991); ONS, Labour Force Survey (1992-latest). See Broome et al (2022: 76) for original. Data adapted for this figure by Zack Grant, any errors are his own.

Note: The figure shows the percentage of family units headed by 30-, 50-, and 70-year-olds that owned their own home in 1976-1980, 1996-2000, and 2016-2020. Figures are derived from data showing the weighted average home ownership rates of five year birth cohorts at the time that they obtained the relevant age. For instance, the data for 30-year-olds in 1976-1980 is derived from the weighted average homeownership rates of those born 1946-1950 when they turned 30. The data for 70-year olds for that period is similarly derived from the homeownership rates of the 1906-1910 cohort when they obtained the age of 70 (etc.).

More generally, young adults are considerably more likely to worry about their economic security than those at or approaching retirement age (Green and de Geus 2022: 22). The Resolution Foundation's analyses of recent government announcements on tax and spending and Office for Budgetary Responsibility forecasts suggests that intergenerational inequality will not let up any time soon. In a continuation of trends during the past two decades, the poverty rate among pensioners (after housing costs) is predicted to remain around 5 percentage points lower than among working-age adults, and around 15 points lower than among children, till at least the late-2020s (Brewer, Fry, and Try 2023: 75).

Britain is also ageing rapidly. In 1990, 9 million (16%) of us were aged 65 and over. In 2020, this number had risen to 13 million (19%). In 2050, it is likely that 18 million – one quarter of the population – will be in this cohort. We will have as many octogenarians as teenagers (ONS 2021a, 2021b). These demographic shifts mean that, as with economic capital, political capital will also increasingly be in the hands of older generations. In fact, the political impact of an ageing population is already being magnified. Firstly, due to young adults' lower rates of enfranchisement and turnout at elections and, secondly, due to their greater tendency to cluster in certain constituencies (major cities and university towns) relative to older voters, who are more evenly spread. See **Appendix A** for more details on these points. As a result it will increasingly fall on older voters either to support policies that benefit their own age group or to tackle the relative challenges facing current younger and future generations. If they choose the former, the already ominous fiscal burden facing future working age taxpayers could prove even more onerous (Dorothée et al. 2019).

What will older voters choose to do with their growing electoral power? One argument proposes that Europe and North America are arriving at a period of 'grey power' or 'gerontocracy'. In this account, empowered older voters re-orientate national welfare states toward their needs and priorities and away from those of relatively powerless younger voters (Berry 2012; Chrisp and Pearce 2019; Munger 2022; Sinn and Uebelmesser 2003; Vlandas 2022). This would seem to fit basic social science assumptions about the individual voter as a self-interested household-income maximiser (Meltzer and Richard 1981; Rehm 2016). It would also appear to have proponents in the national media. Multiple editorials in national outlets have highlighted the alleged malign consequences of Britain's greying electorate for the financial wellbeing and opportunities afforded to the younger generation (Cunliffe 2021; Duncan 2023; Fisher 2022; Pickard 2019; Toynbee 2021, 2023). These concerns are premised on the juxtaposition of the Conservatives' increased reliance on voters in their sixties and over (Chrisp and Pearce 2019) with certain controversial policy decisions made by the party since 2010. For instance, protection of the state pension triple lock has been coupled with the tripling of university tuition fees in 2011, and measures such as the scrapping of compulsory housebuilding targets for local councils in late 2022. The Conservatives have been accused of enacting policies that make life harder for young adults (who are also less likely to vote for the party), whilst appearing considerably more generous in areas impacting the old (who are much more likely to vote for them) (Cunliffe 2021; Duncan 2023; Fisher 2022; Sandher 2021; Toynbee 2021, 2023).

Analysis by the Resolution Foundation, displayed in **Figure 3**, does suggest that it is older adults who have benefited disproportionately as far as recent welfare state reforms go. The figure shows changes in average annual family income as a result of reforms to working-age benefits and the State Pension since between 2010 and 2022-23, by age. All individuals under the age of 65 have generally seen declining incomes, with these drops particularly pronounced among children and those in their thirties and early forties (i.e. the peak child-rearing years), whilst those at or approaching pensionable age have experienced a net increase. On average, under-18s, young adults (18-39) and middle-aged adults (40-59) were, respectively, £1,451, £669, and £577 worse-off per year as a result of post-2010 reforms. Conversely, older adults (60+) were £429 better off per year, with those of retirement age (65+) gaining an additional £666 due to State Pension uprating.

Some of these policy decisions might stem from an assumption among policy-makers that older Britons are primarily or only concerned with their own interests, and that disproportionate investment in this growing electorate is the best way to maximise support. Thus, 'gerontocracy' of an older electorate shifting policy focus towards the older generation becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. And yet current knowledge about the preferences of Britain's older voters is incomplete. Could the Conservatives have maintained the bulk of these voters with a more generous policy offer to young adults? Could Labour yet win some older adults over through their own promises to do more for this younger group? In the next section, we introduce data from our survey designed to address these gaps.

Figure 3: *Net Change in Income by Age Due to Welfare Reforms, 2010 – 2022-23*



Source: Resolution Foundation analysis of Department of Work and Pensions, Family Resources Survey Using the IPPR Tax-Benefit Model. See Broome et al 2022: 38.

Note: The figure shows changes in the average annual family income (in both percentages and in pounds sterling) for individuals of different ages due to reforms to working-age benefits and the State Pension since 2010. Policy changes include: reduction in benefit uprating, two-child limit, removal of the family premium, introduction of the Universal Credit (UC) first-child rate, introduction of the benefit cap, reduction in Council Tax Support, introduction of the Bedroom Tax, removal of the limited capability for work addition, means testing of Child Benefit, freezing local housing allowance rates since 2020, the effect of uprating State Pension by inflation rather than earnings. Full roll-out of UC is assumed. Incomes are equivalised to account for household size.

Section 2: What are people's perceptions of intergenerational inequality?

We designed a large, original survey [Intergenpol-GB] and fielded it to a representative sample of 6,021 adult respondents in Britain in August 2022.[3] From the whole sample, 1,563 were 'young' adults (18-39), 2,272 were 'middle-aged' (40-59), and 2,186 were 'older' (60+).

In this section of the report, we focus on fundamental questions about how well people think different age groups are doing financially. Has information about generational inequality and the precarity facing young adults cut through to people's awareness about inter-generational financial well-being, and in particular, has that trickled up the age distribution?

We first wanted to know if the public considered intergenerational inequality an important topic. To find out, we asked respondents about the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the statement, '***every generation should have a higher standard of living than the one that came before it***', allowing them to respond either 'strongly disagree', 'disagree', 'neither agree nor disagree', 'agree' or 'strongly agree' ('don't knows' were excluded). In **Figure 4**, we present the total percentage of young (18-39), middle-aged (40-59), and older (60+) respondents who agreed (or strongly agreed), disagreed (or strongly disagreed), or who neither agreed nor disagreed with the status of intergenerational progress as an important societal goal. Overall, 53% of respondents agreed with the statement, and there was a large amount of intergenerational consensus. Whilst young adults were (unsurprisingly) the most likely to support the idea of improvements in living standards between birth cohorts (64%), a near majority of middle-aged (50%) and older (48%) adults also felt this way. Less than 1-in-8 of any age cohort dissented from the proposition. There should be, in principle, sympathy amongst older adults for younger people who are living lives little

[3] The fieldwork for the survey was conducted between 12th and 25th August 2022. Survey respondents were selected from participants in the most recent (May 2022) wave of the long-running British Election Study Internet Panel [BESIP], making it possible to use variables from that study. We note in **Appendix B** the source for each variable alongside descriptive statistics.

***Figure 4**: Should Every Generation Have a Higher Standard of Living than the Last?*



Source: Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.

Note: '*How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? … Every generation should have a higher standard of living than the one that came before it*'. The figure shows the percentage of young (18-39), middle-aged (40-59), and older (60+) adults who responded 'agree' (or 'strongly agree'), 'disagree' (or 'strongly disagree'), or 'neither agree nor disagree'. 'Don't know' responses were excluded. N = 1,412 people aged 18-39, 2,159 aged 40-59, and 2,141 aged 60+.

better than those of their parents, not to mention those actively facing downward mobility.

How do people of different generations feel that their living standards measure up to those of their parents? Previous research by the Resolution Foundation found that, in 2016, half of all Britons felt that '*today's youth will have a worse life than their parents*', the fifth highest total among the 22 countries polled (Rahman and Tomlinson 2018: 10). Here, we study feelings of downward social mobility over the entire adult age distribution. We asked respondents, ***'Do you think the standard of living that you will experience throughout your life will be better or worse than the standard of living experienced by your parents?'***. **Figure 5** charts the percentage of younger, middle-aged and older adults replying that their standard of living will be / will have been 'a little (or 'a lot') better', 'a little (or 'a lot') worse', or 'about the same' as their parents. The data excludes 'don't knows'. We purposefully phrased this question in such a way that it could be answered in consideration of both past and (anticipated) future experiences.

***Figure 5**: Will Your Own Lifetime Living Standards Be Better or Worse than Those of Your Parents?*



Source: Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.

Note: '*Do you think the standard of living that you will experience throughout your life will be better or worse than the standard of living experienced by your parents?*. The figure shows the percentage of young, middle-aged, and older adults who responded, 'my standard of living will be / will have been a little better' (or 'a lot better'), 'my standard of living will be / will have been a little worse' (or 'a lot worse'), or 'our standards of living will be / will have been about the same' (i.e. no difference). 'Don't know' responses were excluded. N = 1,204 people aged 18-39, 1,980 aged 40-59, and 2,090 aged 60+.

We also wanted to understand attitudes to overall living standards, rather than in specific domains (e.g. education, employment, or housing), given that we were not sure how an advantage in one domain would be felt to compensate for disadvantage in another.[4]

Overall, the public felt, by 44% to 33%, that they were on track for better lifetime living standards than their parents, rather than worse. However, there was a great deal of difference between the evaluations of older and younger respondents. Whilst almost

[4] Research by Ansell (2023), also conducted in late 2022, indicates that adults over 60 generally see themselves as better off than their parents in terms of education, housing, and earnings; however, those in their twenties and thirties generally only see themselves as improving on their own parents with respect to the former. In general the young are viewed as having better access to education than older generations, but somewhat worse opportunities for social mobility and affordable housing.

two-thirds (65%) of adults over 60 felt that they will have better living standards than their parents, only around a quarter (26%) of adults under 40 felt the same way. More alarmingly, a majority (51%) of the under-40s felt they would actually have worse lifetime living standards than their parents, which is substantially greater than the number of middle-aged (36%) and older (18%) adults who held this view.

When we break this data down further (not displayed), we find that the 30-34 age group are the oldest five-year cohort where an absolute majority feel they are living worse lives than their parents. This suggests that pessimism about one's chances of intergenerational progress in living standards is the norm for those first entering the workforce (or leaving university) during and after the 2008 financial crisis. By contrast, the 50-54 age group is the youngest five-year cohort to contain more people who see themselves as having 'better' rather than 'worse' living standards than their parents (40% to 35%). In general, our data tallies well with the objective evidence for intergenerational regression in financial wellbeing presented in Section 1. Assuming that young adults' forecasts for themselves are (and remain) accurate, this is also a clear violation of the widely held principle of intergenerational progress in living standards depicted in **Figure 4**. Uniquely, among the age groups, today's adults in their twenties and thirties currently expect their lifetime living standards to be worse than those of their parents.

How do those in older age groups perceive the wellbeing of the current generation of adults in their twenties and thirties? Our survey allows us to approach this question from multiple angles. First, we asked respondents whether they agreed with the statement, '***today's younger generation has it a lot easier than older generations did when they were young'.*** The results, which pool agreement and disagreement in the same manner as before, are presented in **Figure 6**. Whilst respondents were evenly split on this question (37% agreeing and 37% dissenting) overall, there is much disagreement between the generations. Only one-in-five (21%) young adults think they have it a lot easier than older generations, whereas two-in-five middle-aged adults and slightly under half (46%) of older adults believe that they do. Next, we asked adults whether they agreed or disagreed that, '***the younger generation does not get its fair share of the nation's wealth***'. This is a useful question given that it invites normative statements about what people of different ages feel young adults *should* be getting, ra-

Figure 6: *Does Today's Younger Generation Have it a Lot Easier than Older Generations Did?*



Figure 7: *Does the Younger Generation Not Get its Fair Share of the Nation's Wealth?*



Source: Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.

Note (Figure 6): '*How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? … Today's younger generation has it a lot easier than older generations did when they were young*'. The figure shows the percentage of young (18-39), middle-aged (40-59), and older (60+) adults who responded 'agree' (or 'strongly agree'), 'disagree' (or 'strongly disagree'), or 'neither agree nor disagree'. 'Don't know' responses were excluded. N = 1,457 people aged 18-39, 2,170 aged 40-59, and 2,139 aged 60+.

Note (Figure 7): '*How much do you agree or disagree … The younger generation does not get its fair share of the nation's wealth*'. The figure shows the percentage of young, middle-aged, and older adults who responded 'agree' (or 'strongly agree'), 'disagree' (or 'strongly disagree'), or 'neither agree nor disagree'. 'Don't know' responses were excluded. N = 1,394 people aged 18-39, 2,074 aged 40-59, and 2,053 aged 60+.

-ther than descriptions about how the young's current takings measure up to those of older adults (both now and in the past). **Figure 7** charts the responses. Overall, more people agree (41%) than disagree (28%), but, once again, there is a generation gap. Two-thirds of the under-forties (67%) feel that their generation is not getting its fair share economically, but only just over one-third (37%) and just under one-quarter (23%) of middle-aged and older adults share this opinion.

At first glance, middle-aged and older adults appear not to consider today's young to have a particularly unprecedented claim to hardship or unjust deserts. However, before we dismiss older generations as entirely unsympathetic to, or ignorant of, problems further down the age distribution, we should consider two points:

1. It is notable that fewer than half of adults aged 40-59 or 60+ actively endorse the proposition that today's younger generation has it a lot easier or disagree with the proposition that today's young do not get their fair share of national wealth.

2. It may be that older respondents' answers are determined less by a belief that today's young are doing particularly well financially, and more by them taking offense at a perceived accusation embedded in both questions. To disagree with the idea that the young have it easier than they did, or to agree that the young are currently getting an 'unfair share' would be to minimise struggles they themselves faced at an earlier age, or to indict themselves for failing to bequeath a better world to the next generation.

To get a clearer sense of how each age group views the current financial wellbeing of different age cohorts in Britain, we asked, **'*Giving your best guess, how well do you think that each of the following groups are doing financially, on average: (1) Young adults in their late teens, twenties and thirties*** (i.e. 18-39 year-olds); ***(2) Middle-aged adults in their forties and fifties*** (i.e. 40-59 year olds); **(3)** ***Older adults in their sixties, seventies and over'*** (i.e. 60+ year olds)**.** Responses were plotted on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 ('*doing very badly*') to 10 ('*doing very well*'). 'Don't know' responses were excluded. In **Figure 8**, we have broken down average ratings of all three age cohorts by age of the respondent. The average respondent rated young adults' finances

Figure 8: *Perceptions of the Financial Wellbeing of Different Age Groups*



Source: Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.

Note: '*Giving your best guess, how well do you think that each of the following groups are doing financially, on average*: (1) *Young adults in their late teens, twenties and thirties* (i.e. people aged 18-39) (2) *Middle-aged adults in their forties and fifties* (i.e. people aged 40-59); (3) *Older adults in their sixties, seventies and over'* (i.e. people aged 60+). The figure plots the weighted average rating of each age group – measured from 0 ('doing very badly') to 10 ('doing very well') – according to respondents of every age. 'Don't know' responses were excluded. These are smoothed estimates based on a local regression function. N = 4,951 ratings of 18–39-year-olds, 5,058 ratings of 40–59-year-olds, and 5,093 ratings for 60+ year-olds.

as 4.1/10, middle-aged adults' as 5.5/10, and older adults' as 5.8/10. Although young people themselves predictably give the most negative evaluations of their own age group's financial wellbeing, respondents under the age of seventy also affirm that it is young adults who are generally felt to be doing worse economically than middle-aged and older adults. The average rating for young adults given by those in their forties, fifties, and sixties places young adults closer to the bottom of the scale ('doing badly') than the top ('doing well'). Only respondents in their seventies and eighties are slightly different, rating young adults' circumstances as similar to that of their own age group. However, it is notable that there is no real sense that younger people are doing particularly 'well' financially: the under-forties are deemed merely to be (like the over-sixties) at the midpoint of the scale of financial wellbeing.

Figure 9 makes the picture clearer. Here we took responses to the same set of questions and calculated the percentage of young (18-39), middle-aged (40-59), and older (60+) respondents who rated a particular age cohort's financial circumstance as being the worst. This is the number of respondents who gave a lower score to young adults than middle-aged and older adults, or a lower score to middle-aged adults than young and older adults etc. A further column charts the percentage who, instead, gave at least two or more age groups an equally 'worst' score. Overall, 59% of respondents said that it was young adults (under-forties) who were struggling the most financially. Only 5% and 17% said that middle-aged and older adults, respectively, were doing the worst. Importantly, this general pattern holds true for all age groups. Even though young adults themselves were the nearest to unanimity in the belief that their age group has it worst (76% felt this way), a majority (59%) of middle-aged adults and only slightly under half (45%) of older adults felt the same.[5] Respondents in their forties, fifties, sixties and beyond have a greater degree of awareness of the financial difficulties facing many younger people described in Section 1 than might have been anticipated.

The public's knowledge of age inequalities in financial wellbeing extends to much more specific questions. Discussions of intergenerational inequality in Britain tend to offer the slowdown in homeownership rates among the current crop of adults in their twenties and thirties as a major manifestation of the problems facing young adults. Resolution Foundation research reveals that Millennials (born 1981-1996) are substantially less likely to own their own home than members of the Baby Boomer generation (born 1946-1965), both currently and also when the Baby Boomers were in their twenties and thirties themselves, back in the mid-1960s to late-1980s (Broome et al. 2022: 76). Whilst we deemed it unreasonable to expect our survey respondents to be able to recall historical homeownership rates, we were interested in the extent to whi-

[5] The results are even more emphatic when we calculate the percentage who saw each group as doing better than the other two (not displayed). Overall, only 8% of respondents (including fewer than one-in-ten middle-aged and older-adults) felt young adults were doing the best, as opposed to 21% who said middle-aged adults and 45% who said older adults. Thirty per cent of older (60+) adults said that their own group was doing best, a very similar percentage that felt that their group was doing the worst (31%), highlighting the division of opinion amongst older respondents.

Figure 9: *Which Age Group is Doing the Worst Financially?*



Source: Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.

Note: Using the same data as in Figure 8, Figure 9 shows the percentage of younger, middle-aged, and older respondents who gave their lowest rating (i.e. the group they felt was the worst-off financially) to 18–39-year-olds, 40–59-year-olds, and 60+ year-olds, as well as the percentage who gave at least two age groups their joint lowest score. N = 1,218 people aged 18-39, 1,776 aged 40-59, and 1,832 60+ year-olds.

-ch they recognised how stark the current gap in homeownership is between those in their twenties and thirties and those in their sixties and seventies. Accordingly, we asked, '***Out of every 100 people in their twenties and thirties* [*sixties, seventies and over*] *in Britain today, roughly how many do you think own their own home, including mortgage holders?*'. On average, respondents guessed that 35% of 20–39-year-olds own their homes compared to 70% of older adults, leading to an average estimated gap of 35 percentage points. This is remarkably close to data on home ownership rates. According to data from the British Election Study conducted a few months prior to our survey (May 2022), the homeownership rate among 20–39-year-olds was 36%, as opposed to 80% for those aged 60 and over. The gap in homeownership rates thus stood at 44 percentage points. Our survey respondents demonstrate an impressive degree of accuracy, even if the true rate of homeownership amongst older adults was slightly underestimated. Middle-aged adults guessed a homeownership gap of 36-points (34% v 70%) and older adults were only marginally less accurate with a perceived 32-point gap (36% v 68%).[6] Older people are not, generally, ignorant of high-profile difficulties facing younger adults.

Having demonstrated a degree of awareness among older adults about financial problems facing the young, the next section explains a key source of this awareness. It also demonstrates that concern for the wellbeing of one's close younger relatives may be a key consideration when evaluating/anticipating the political responsiveness from the older generation.

[6] Overall only 26% of people (including 26% of middle-aged adults and 27% of older adults) radically underestimated homeownership inequality by estimating a gap between old and young that was 20-points or smaller or estimating that the young were more likely to own a home.

Section 3: How many people have young relatives that are struggling financially?

Family ties are one of the reasons why substantial numbers of middle-aged and older adults have noticed the financial problems facing younger people and, as we shall soon show, want to alleviate them. These connections provide a way for adults in their forties, fifties, sixties and beyond to acquire information about the economic hardship facing loved ones further down the age distribution, and provide several important reasons for them to be responsive to this information.

As a counterpoint to 'grey power'-style self-interest motivations, familial ties between older voters and their children, grandchildren, nieces and nephews (etc.) could place a natural limit on the willingness of the former to over-tax and under-invest in the next generation (Duffy 2021: 247; Hutton 2021). Rather than maximising their own personal gains, older adults may consider the concerns and interests of their younger relatives and vote (partly) on their behalf. This is, crucially, one implication of rising levels of intergenerational inequality: many of today's retirees, unlike their predecessors, have the requisite economic security to enable them to prioritise the needs of their younger family members rather than themselves (Green and de Geus 2022).

A lot of social science research has found that the highest levels of concern for the wellbeing of others tends to be demonstrated by members of a common social group. Shared identities appear to facilitate solidarity. This insight is often used to explain why wealthier individuals are less likely to support economic redistribution in some more ethnically heterogeneous societies (Rueda and Stegmueller 2019: 149) or why conditions in one's local community (Bisgaard, Dinesen, and Sønderskov 2016; Rogers 2014) and the wellbeing of co-ethnics (Green, Hellwig, and Fieldhouse 2022) are good predictors of one's vote choice alongside the circumstances facing geographic or racial out-groups. People tend to be most informed about and sympathetic towards problems facing members of their own 'in-group'. When it comes to generating understanding and compassion for other generations, one common 'in-group' stands before all others: the family.

A 'family-centric' model of financial concern seems plausible to us for two major reasons: emotional bonds and linked fates.

Emotional bonds: Connections between older citizens and their adult children remain strong, pervasive, and laden with emotional meaning. In the 2000s, 40-60% of adult children with a living parent in Britain reported weekly face-to-face contact with at least one parent, a figure that rose to 80-90% once letters, telephone calls and electronic contact were included (Kalmijn and De Vries 2009: 267). The advent of ever cheaper and easier methods of communication (family WhatsApp groups etc.) in the last decade has probably made regular intergenerational contact even easier. In 2016, YouGov found that over 60% of adults in their twenties, thirties, and forties spoke to their mother (among those whose mother had not deceased) at least once a week by phone or internet, with over 80% of adults aged 18-24 at least sending their mother an email, texts or online message during the same time period (Smith 2016). About one-in-five adult women reported speaking to their mother by phone or internet at least once a day. Such strong family networks provide an important arena for intergenerational contact, and a medium through which signals about the difficulties facing younger generations in accessing affordable childcare, housing, and educational opportunities (etc.) might be transmitted to older generations not facing these issues themselves. Many of these child-mother interactions may also arise due to the practical (and financial) support already being given by mothers to their offspring, due to those children's needs and their parent's relative financial wellbeing.

Familial bonds give older adults a reason to act on these signals. Internationally, inter-generational relationships remain a highly important source of companionship, reassurance, support, and encouragement (Dykstra and Fokkema 2011; Fingerman et al. 2016; Swartz 2009: 194–96; Thomas, Liu, and Umberson 2017), with conflicted or ambivalent familial relations being less common (Boersch-Supan, Heller, and Reil-Held 2011; Katz 2009). Research in gerontology indicates that quality of life for older adults is positively associated with active relations with non-co-resident children and grandchildren, providing a source of esteem and identity (Danielsbacka, Křenková, and Tanskanen 2022; Katz 2009; Thomas, Liu, and Umberson 2017: 5). Conversely, a recent study linked worries about young adult relatives, and the stress of having to support them, with poorer sleep quality for mothers and fathers in their fifties and sixties (Seidel et al. 2018). Exposure to children with poor economic and social circumstances has also been linked to rates of parental depression (Fingerman et al. 2012; Tosi 2020). Concerns for younger family members may also be associated with some level of guilt if those family members are struggling and they are not, and if they themselves had greater prospects at the same age in the life-cycle. It stands to reason that older adults would, very plausibly, wish to protect the wellbeing of their loved ones, both through support for policies targeted at helping them, and supporting parties advocating for them at the ballot box.

Linked fates: A desire to support their own economic interests may also motivate older adults to support their children's financial wellbeing. Relatives of a struggling younger adult are exposed to substantial risks to their own time and money. Declining homeownership rates among younger adults have, for instance, resulted in an increased occupancy of spare rooms in parental homes, and financial contributions from parents are often required to access the housing ladder (Duffy 2021; Flynn 2020: 327; Fry 2022; Jabbour 2023; Matsudaira 2016; Sefton and Falkingham 2023). Resolution Foundation research reveals that the share of 20–34-year-olds outside of full-time education living with their parents increased from around 22% in 2002 to 30% in 2019, before increasing to around 1-in-3 during the Covid pandemic (Broome et al. 2022, 72). Parents who do achieve an 'empty nest' often pay a heavy price for helping their children move out. The boom in British house prices since the 1990s has left most young adults dependent upon family assistance to access the property ladder. Only 26% of first-time buyers who purchased property between 1990 and 1994 reported requiring financial help from their parents; for those purchasing in the 2015 to 2019 period, dependence upon parental support had more than doubled to 54% (Ibbetson 2022).

These parental contributions are by no means negligible. A 2019 study found that the average parental contribution for British homebuyers totalled over £24,000 (a £6,000 increase on 2018), enough to make 'the bank of mum and dad' the 10th largest mortgage lender in the country (BBC 2019). Another study looking at total lifetime gifts (i.e. excluding bequests) between parents and children calculated the total national value of these transfers as an enormous £11bn each year (Sefton and Falkingham 2023), enough to show, '*the older generations do care and they are passing down a significant* *amount*' (Giles 2023). Even those not able to contribute to their children's financial wellbeing may find themselves providing extensive babysitting duties given the unusually high costs of private childcare in Britain (Topping 2021). Polling on behalf of the charity Age UK (Age UK 2017) revealed that around 40% of grandparents over 50 provided weekly childcare for their grandchildren, with over half of this number doing so to allow the children's parents to increase their hours at work. They may of course do this very willingly, due to their emotional bonds to these younger relatives and their own satisfaction in helping to raise the new generation, but it does at least imply *some* shared interest in financial wellbeing for younger generations, if only to ease the total burden on themselves.

In one sense we can interpret these trends as a sort of 'new social risk' (Bonoli 2007) or externality for older adults that stems from rising intergenerational inequality in combination with norms of familial obligation. Rather than investing their increased wealth on a comfortable retirement plan, or spending their free time for their own recreation or health, an increasing number of older adults are facing the real prospect of continuing to provide for their adult children for an extended period (Flynn 2020, 338). The scale of these transactions makes it plausible that tax increases associated with a government expanding provision for the young (and by association one's relatives) ultimately proves cheaper, through burden sharing, to older voters than providing direct support to family members.

In summary, people in their forties, fifties and beyond have altruistic and more self-interested reasons to be attentive to the wellbeing of their young adult relatives. How widespread are these sorts of ties?

Figure 10 presents three lines demonstrating the percentage of people in our sample, by year of age, who have either a child (solid red line) or grandchild (solid black line) aged 18-39, or else have any other 'close family member' (however the respondent defined this) in that age cohort (dashed black line). All-in-all, around 70% of adults over-40 have 'close family members' in their young adult years. Around 36% have a child in this age category, including the majority of those in their fifties and sixties, and around 11% have a young adult grandchild, which rises to over 40% among those in their mid-seventies to late eighties. Overall, over half (54%) of those aged 50 and over have either a young adult child or grandchild.[7] Older adults without at least one personal connection to a young adult (or adults) are in the minority.

These connections matter to people. We asked all our respondents the extent to which they agreed or disagreed that, '***The living standards of my close family members are of the utmost importance to me***'. The results, grouped by age cohort of respondent in **Figure 11**, demonstrate a good degree of intergenerational consensus about the importance of the family. Overall, 72% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, including over 70% of young (18-39), middle-aged (40-59), and older (60+) adults. Fewer than one-in-fifteen people in any of these age cohorts disagreed with the statement. Another survey question (not displayed) provided additional evidence of the importance of family bonds. We asked respondents, '***Do you feel a sense of belonging to any of the following groups? *Please tick all that apply.****', followed by 7 potential sources of association: Your local community; The middle class; The working class; Your ethnic group; Your generation; People of your level of education; Your family. One's family was by far and away the most popular choice, with 63% of respondents, including 60% of middle-aged adults and 68% of older adults, stating a feeling of belonging to their family. Importantly, this was more than twice the number (29%, including 20% of middle-aged adults and 35% of older ones) who said they felt a sense of belonging to their generation, which was the next most popular response. Fewer than 40% of any age group said they felt a sense of belonging to either social class. We have, therefore, very reasonable grounds to assume that most middle-aged and older people in Britain have deeply-valued family connections to young adults.

The above is not evidence in itself that people will necessarily support policies that benefit other people in their family while also incurring a greater tax burden on themselves, nor that they will vote for a party that advocates for those policies. However, it shows the *potential* for family networks to be a very important consideration. Another necessary ingredient is for a person to have connections to young adult relatives who are actually struggling financially, and therefore in potential

[7] And, of course, many more will have a teenage child, grandchild or other close relative that is about to enter their 'young adult' years and grapple with leaving home and pursuing further education or finding employment.

***Figure 10:** Familial Links to Young Adults by Age*



***Figure 11:** Are the Living Standards of Your Close Relatives of Utmost Importance?*



Source: Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.

Note (Figure 10): Solid red line indicates the percentage of respondents with a young adult child (aged 18-39) by age. Solid black line indicates the percentage of respondents with a young adult grandchild by age. Dashed black line indicates the percentage of respondents that were able to evaluate the financial wellbeing of close relatives aged 18-39 (see Figure 12) when asked. We use this as a proxy for the lower bound of respondents with at least one close relative aged 18-39. N = 4,458 people aged 40+.

Note (Figure 11): '*How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? … The living standards of my close family members are of the utmost importance to me*'. The figure shows the percentage of young, middle-aged, and older adults who responded 'agree' (or 'strongly agree'), 'disagree' (or 'strongly disagree'), or 'neither agree nor disagree'. 'Don't know' responses were excluded. N = 1,442 people aged 18-39, 2,199 aged 40-59, and 2,151 aged 60+.

need of state intervention.

To find out how many middle-aged and older voters had connections to young adult relatives that were in financial difficulty, we asked respondents, '***Thinking about your own close family, how well are family members in the following age groups doing financially, on average? …Close family members in their late teens, twenties and thirties***' (i.e. 18-39 year-olds). Respondents were asked to evaluate the financial circumstances of their relatives in these three age groups on an 11-point scale running from 0 ('doing very badly') to 10 ('doing very well'). Those with no close family members in that age group, as well as those who did not know how to evaluate their family members, were invited to select a further 'NA' option. For ease of interpretation, we classified anyone that gave their relatives between 0 and 4 out of 10 (i.e. below the midpoint of the scale) as having close family members that were struggling financially. Given that our question asked respondents to respond based on the *average* financial wellbeing of their close young adult relatives, this group will be somewhat smaller than the total number with any single close young adult relative in financial difficulty. (After all, one might still want government to improve access to housing and education if one has two fairly financially stable children, but one who cannot leave home or find a good quality job, and this sort of person might be obscured if their 'average' rating for young adult relatives is pushed upward by their first two children).

The percentage of respondents with financially struggling young adult relatives, by age, is presented in **Figure 12** (the solid red line). For comparison, we plot the percentage of respondents who gave their relatives aged 40-59 and 60+ a 4/10 or less for average financial wellbeing (dashed black and grey lines, respectively). The denominator includes those reporting no close relatives of that age at all and, again, these estimates have been smoothed using a local regression function.

There are signs that information about economic problems facing younger generations has made its way to older respondents via their relatives. Aggregate statistics about increasing intergenerational economic inequality (Broome et al. 2022; Green and de Geus 2022) are noticed in the context of one's own family. Over 1-in-4 middle-aged respondents (28%) and around 1-in-5 older respondents (19%) reported ha-

Figure 12: *Familial Links to Financially Struggling Adults of Different Age Groups by Age*



Source: Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.

Note: '*Thinking about your own close family, how well are family members in the following age groups doing financially, on average? If you don't know any close family members in that age group, tick 'Not applicable':* (1) *Close family members in their late teens, twenties, and thirties* (i.e. relatives aged 18–39); (1) *Close family members in their forties and fifties* (i.e. relative aged 40–59-years)*;* (3) *Close family members in their sixties, seventies and over'* (i.e. relatives aged 60+). Responses were measured on a scale from 0 ('doing very badly') to 10 ('doing very well'). The figure shows the percentage of people of different ages with 18–39 (solid red line), 40–59 (solid black line), or 60+ (dashed grey line) year-old relatives who averaged 4 and under on the 11-point scale (i.e. closer to 'doing badly' than 'doing well'). These are smoothed estimates based on a local regression function. Note that those with no relatives in the relevant age group are *not* excluded from the total figures. N = 4,458 people aged 40+.

-ving younger family members doing badly. Overall, 24% of over-forties are in this position, with the rates particularly high among those in their mid-to-late fifties (31%).

Furthermore, most adults over forty are more likely to have struggling young adult relatives than struggling relatives in older age cohorts. Fewer respondents aged 40 and over reported that close family members aged 40-59 (14%) and 60+ (15%) were struggling financially. Only among respondents aged 70 and over is having struggling young adult relatives (narrowly) less common than having struggling family members further along the life cycle (in this case, those in their sixties and seventies). There are, therefore, a substantial number of middle-aged and older adults who will be worrying about the financial prospects of their children, grandchildren, nieces, and nephews, and may have reason to want the government to do more for the younger generation.

In fact, this 'hidden electorate', the 24% of adults aged forty-and-over with struggling younger relatives, comprises as much as 17% of all British adults according to our sample, which is equivalent to around 7.9 million potential voters as of December 2021 (ONS 2022).

Middle-aged and older adults who are exposed to financially struggling young adult family members tend to be sympathetic to the status of young adults in modern Britain more broadly. Overall, 45% and 40% of middle-aged and older adults, respectively, with financially struggling young adult relatives 'disagreed' or 'strongly disagreed' with the statement that '*today's younger generation has it a lot easier than older generations did when they were young*' (**Figure 6**). This compares to only 28% and 25% of middle-aged and older adults, respectively, who lacked such a connection. Similarly, 51% and 40% of middle-aged and older adults, respectively, who had struggling young adult relatives 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' that '*the younger generation does not get its fair share of the nation's wealth*' (**Figure 7**), versus only 31% of middle-aged adults, and just 19% of older adults, who did not.

Importantly, we can conclude that the subjective evaluations of younger relatives' circumstances are rooted, to a significant extent, in objective material conditions. Previous research has found that it is young people without a university degree or access to the housing ladder who tend to display the highest levels of economic insecurity in contemporary Britain (Green and de Geus 2022). It follows, therefore, that we should expect the parents of these individuals to be most worried about their younger family members' prospects. This is exactly what we find. In supplementary analysis (not displayed), we find that parents whose eldest child (aged 18-39) holds a degree and owns property rate the financial wellbeing of their younger relatives about 1.4 points (equivalent to 0.7 standard deviations) higher on the 11-point scale of financial wellbeing than parents whose eldest child has neither[8]. Parents whose child had one of these assets but not the other fell somewhere in-between. This difference only decreased slightly (to around 1 point, or 0.5 standard deviations) when we statistically adjusted for underlying differences between these two types of parents in

[8] Alternatively, 42% of adults aged 40+ with an eldest child who lacks both a degree and property report that their young adult relatives were 'doing badly' (i.e. <5/10) financially. Only 19% of adults aged 40+ with an eldest child who has both a degree and property said the same thing.

terms of age, education, household income, property tenure and value, employment status, occupational class, and region — factors which themselves proved only weak predictors of respondents' levels of concern about their younger relatives.[9] This means that, in our survey, it is not only economically marginalised parents who are worried about their children's financial prospects.

Another way that one could measure people's concern about their younger relatives would be to ask them how likely they feel it is that they would have to support these relatives themselves. As we discussed, people might have a compassionate response to seeing the difficulties experienced by younger generations, and they might also be concerned about the additional burden (financial or otherwise) to themselves that could arise as a result.

In our survey, we asked, '***During the next 10 years or so, how likely or unlikely is it that you will need to give significant financial or practical assistance to a close family member in their twenties and thirties with childcare or housing needs?*'.** Respondents could answer 'very likely', 'fairly unlikely', 'neither likely nor unlikely', or 'fairly unlikely' or 'very likely'. Unlike the previous question, this question included a prospective element (i.e. fear might have to support in the next 10 years, rather than at this moment) and referred to concern about at least one family member rather than asking about family members on average. Together, this means that a greater number of people are likely to be classified as having concerns about the wellbeing of younger relatives here than with the previous question.[10] In **Figure 13**, we pool those who said 'very' or 'fairly' likely and those who said 'very' or 'fairly unlikely' and give the percentages of middle-aged (40-59) and older (60+) adults in either category, alongside those who said neither. Overall, we find that slightly fewer than 1-in-3 adults aged 40-

[9] Our multivariable OLS regression also controlled for average differences between survey respondents in terms of gender and number of young adult children. Full results are available upon request.

[10] Responses to the two questions map on to each other in an intuitive way: 50% of adults over forty who said that their close younger relatives were doing 'badly' financially (i.e. <5/10) felt that it was 'fairly' or 'very' likely that they would have to provide for a young adult family member in the next decade. In contrast, only 30% of adults over forty who said relatives in that age group were doing 'well' (i.e. >5/10), and only 15% who said they currently had no close young adult relatives, held this view.

Figure 13: *Is it Likely that You Will Have to Give Significant Financial / Practical Assistance to a Young Adult Relative in the Next Decade?*



Source: Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.

Note: '*During the next 10 years or so, how likely or unlikely is it that…You will need to give significant financial or practical assistance to a close family member in their twenties and thirties with childcare or housing needs?*'. The figure shows the percentage of young, middle-aged, and older adults who responded 'very' or 'fairly unlikely', 'neither likely nor unlikely', or 'very' or 'fairly likely'. 'Don't know' responses were excluded. N = 1,221 people aged 40-59, and 1,967 aged 60+.

59 (32%) and 60+ (31%) deem it likely that they will have to give significance assistance (whether in terms of time or money) to a younger relative in the next decade. Only slightly fewer than half of both groups were confident enough to say that this risk was 'unlikely'. Clearly, from a more self-interested perspective, there is a substantial number of adults in their forties, fifties and beyond who have family-related reasons to support increased government provision for the younger generation. This, along with the more altruistic (emotional bonds) explanations we give above, should mean that people have strong concerns for their family members, and – if those family members are struggling financially – should be motivated to support policies in the interests of other generations; notably those younger generations who people recognise are doing worse financially in contemporary Britain.[11]

[11] Adults over forty with young adult relatives doing badly (<5/10) were slightly more accurate in estimating the rate of intergenerational inequality in homeownership (pages 19-21).

Because of family ties, adults in their forties, fifties and beyond are not blind to intergenerational inequality. Moreover, as we shall soon show, they want government to do something about it.

Section 4: How do people with young relatives that are struggling financially think about different government policies?

We propose that negative evaluations of younger family members' finances might positively predict support for greater state spending on young adults, among those in their forties, fifties and beyond. To test this, we asked questions about respondents' support for increased investment in services predominantly used by young adults, and the extent to which they would like government to prioritise these services over spending benefiting older age groups.

During recent years, young British adults and their advocates have recurrently cited lack of access to affordable university education, vocational training, childcare, and housing as major grievances (Broome et al. 2022; Cominetti et al. 2022; Timperley 2020; Topping 2021). Accordingly, we asked respondents: '***Would you support or oppose increased government spending on the following, even if it leads to increasing taxes or a reduction of spending elsewhere?***', followed by a list of policies:

a) '*Increasing the amount of affordable housing built in your local area*'

b) '*Increasing the amount of council housing built in your local area'*

c) '*Increasing free vocational or technical education for non-University students*'

d) '*Increasing free education for University students*'

e) '*Increasing free childcare for pre-schoolers*'

Respondents were asked whether they 'strongly oppose', 'slightly oppose', 'neither support nor oppose', 'slightly support', or 'strongly support' the proposal. They could also respond 'don't know', however we omit these undecideds from the following graphs and analysis.

We note two features of these questions. First, we force respondents to consider the personal costs of supporting these measures by referencing potential tax rises or spending cuts elsewhere. This is designed to maximise the validity of answers by forcing consideration of budgetary trade-offs (rather than seeing this as an array of policies that don't imply any costs). For similar reasons, we refer to proposals for more housing '*in your local area*' in order to more plausibly induce considerations about the potentially negative implications for one's own property's value (Ansell 2023), making this more realistic. Secondly, we distinguish 'university' and 'non-university' tertiary education, and 'affordable' and 'council' housing. We offer policies that would seem more familiar and useful to less affluent, working-class and older respondents (i.e. apprenticeships and council housing), as well as policies appealing to wealthier and aspirational (and younger) middle classes (i.e. university education and a route to homeownership). Each respondent should, therefore, find items that would potentially assist their own family members.

We present several graphs showing the overall percentage of adults in both age groups that support each proposal (excluding 'don't knows'), alongside the percentage support among adults with different levels of exposure to struggling young adult relatives. To do this, we use the question introduced in the previous section, which asked respondents to evaluate the average financial wellbeing of their close young adult family members aged 18-39 on a scale between 0 ('doing very badly') to 10 ('doing very well'). We distinguish between those with young relatives that are 'doing badly' (0-4/10), 'doing well' (6-10/10) or 'neither badly nor well' (5/10), as well as those who gave no rating because they do not have close young adult relatives to evaluate. For the reasons that we described in the previous section, we expect adults with young relatives that are 'doing badly' financially to be considerably more likely than others in the same age group to support each of the five proposals.

We begin with proposals for more government intervention in Britain's housing market. In **Figure 14**, we present support for government spending to provide both more 'affordable housing' and 'council housing' in the respondent's local area. We expect our respondents to understand that 'council housing' refers to accommodation provided by local government at low rents for those on lower incomes. After all, those in their fifties, sixties and seventies will have come of age during a time when around 1-in-3 households were in the social rental sector (1980-81 figures), rather than the 1-in-6 that were during the last decade or so (DLUHC 2022: 8). 'Affordable housing' usually refers to property built and sold by private companies at a discounted rate, often aimed explicitly at younger, first-time buyers (Maunder 2023). We concluded that it was important to specify that the proposal for more constructions was not just any

***Figure 14**: Support for Government Spending on Housing by Age Group and Exposure to Struggling Younger Relatives*



Source: Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.

Note: '*Would you support or oppose increased government spending on the following, even if it leads to increasing taxes or a reduction of spending elsewhere?*... (1) 'increasing the amount of affordable housing built in your local area', (2) 'increasing the amount of council housing built in your local area'. The potential responses were 'strongly oppose', 'slightly oppose', 'neither support nor oppose', 'slightly support', or 'strongly support'. The figure shows the percentage of respondents that either 'slightly' or 'strongly' supported either proposal. 'Don't know' responses were excluded. Responses are broken down by age group (distinguishing middle-aged, 40-59, and older, 60+, respondents) and evaluations of the average financial wellbeing of one's young adult relatives (see Figure 12). For each age group, the figure displays the overall support for each proposal, and among those who rated their young adult relatives as 'doing badly' (<5/10 for financial wellbeing) or 'doing well' (>5/10) financially, or 'neither' (5), as well as the support amongst those with no close relatives aged 18-39 at all. In both age groups, those with young adult relatives who are doing badly financially are notably more likely to support both spending proposals than those with more financially well-off younger relatives and those with no relatives at all. N ('affordable housing') = 2,094 people aged 40-59, and 2,135 people aged 60+. N ('council housing') = 2,087 people aged 40-59, and 2,120 people aged 60+.

type of housing, given that people with struggling younger relatives may be concerned that any new buildings might be luxury second homes or the like. That said, given recent controversy over what constitutes genuinely affordable homes to those on mid to lower incomes (Barton and Wilson 2022), we acknowledge that public scepticism surrounding just how cheap these properties really are might influence our findings.

Overall, 60% of adults aged 18+ (including 64% of those aged 18-39) supported the proposal for more government spending on building affordable housing locally, with 51% (47% of those aged 18-39) supporting more council housing. Support among middle-aged and older adults specifically was considerably higher than we might have assumed. Fifty six per cent of adults aged 40-59 supported the affordable housing proposal, and 48% supported more council housing. Among adults aged 60+, support was 61% and 57%, respectively. Overall, it would appear that the opponents of new construction projects aimed at first-time buyers and those on low incomes do seem to be a loud minority, and do not reflect the opinions of the majority of people in their forties, fifties and over.

A major reason for this appears to be that people with financially struggling young adult family members demonstrate considerably higher than average support for these proposals. Support for more affordable and council housing among middle-aged adults with financially struggling younger family members is 64% and 54%, respectively, as opposed to 55% and 44% and 51% and 43% for those whose young adult relatives are doing well or those who have no close relatives in that age group. There is a similar gap among older adults. Seventy two per cent and 70% of adults in their sixties and over who have young adult relatives doing badly financially support building more affordable and council housing locally, respectively, as opposed to 59% and 53% of those whose younger relatives are doing well, or 56% and 51% of those who have no close young relatives. Even a narrow majority of middle-aged and older adults who have no close younger relatives still support government spending more on building affordable housing in their area. This demonstrates that one's familial connections to young adults are not the only thing that determines opinion on this subject. However, it is also clearly the case that the coalition for more housebuilding would be quite a bit smaller if they were of no consideration at all.

We also examined whether the influence of having struggling younger relatives on attitudes towards housing policy is simply a result of other correlated factors, such as respondents' own financial precarity. For this purpose, we conducted multivariable analyses controlling for such 'confounders'. Among all our respondents over-forty, there is a 10-point gap in support for more affordable housing between those whose young adult relatives are doing badly financially and those whose young adult relatives are doing well (67% v 57%). This 10-point gap did not decrease at all once we statistically adjusted (via a multivariable OLS regression) for underlying differences between those two groups in terms of exact age, gender, education, household income, property tenure and value, employment status, occupational class, and region. Nor did it shrink when we controlled for their subjective evaluations of the recent and anticipated future performances of the national economy and their own personal household finances.[12] On council housing, there was an initial 11-point gap between over-forties with relatives doing badly and well (60% v 49% support) and, once again, this gulf was entirely undisturbed by controlling for the aforementioned list of variables. In sum, the impact of having a struggling young adult relative on attitudes to housing policy does not seem to be down to adults with badly-off family members being poorer, more working class, or more negative about the national economy and their own household finances.

What about tertiary education?

In our survey, 48% of adults polled (and 55% of those aged 18-39) supported government increasing spending to provide more free university education, and 62% (as well as 62% of those under-40 specifically) felt the same way about non-university vocational and technical education.

Figure 15 shows how these patterns varied by age and links to struggling young adult family members. Forty seven per cent of adults aged 40-59 supported the university education proposal and 60% supported more vocational and technical training. Among adults aged 60+, support was 43% and 65%, respectively. Whilst support for more government provision of free university education is clearly a minority position amongst middle-aged and older adults, support for vocational and technical education is widely supported among both age cohorts. We can also detect a role for consideration of one's younger relatives here, although the size of these associations varies quite a bit this time. For the proposal concerning university education, support among middle-aged adults is 56% for the subgroup with struggling young adult relatives, 45% for the people with family members that are doing well financially, and

[12] For a description of how these variables were measured, see **Appendix B**. Full results from these regressions are available upon request.

Figure 15: *Support for Government Spending on Tertiary Education by Age Group and Exposure to Struggling Younger Relatives*



Source: Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.

Note: '*Would you support or oppose increased government spending on the following, even if it leads to increasing taxes or a reduction of spending elsewhere?*... (1) 'increasing free education for University students', (2) 'increasing free vocational or technical education for non-University students'. The potential responses were 'strongly oppose', 'slightly oppose', 'neither support nor oppose', 'slightly support', or 'strongly support'. The figure shows the percentage of respondents that either 'slightly' or 'strongly' supported either proposal. 'Don't know' responses were excluded. Responses are broken down by age group (distinguishing middle-aged, 40-59, and older, 60+, respondents) and evaluations of the average financial wellbeing of one's young adult relatives (see Figure 12). For each age group, the figure displays the overall support for each proposal, and among those who rated their young adult relatives as 'doing badly' (<5/10 for financial wellbeing) or 'doing well' (>5/10) financially, or 'neither' (5), as well as the support amongst those with no close relatives aged 18-39 at all. In both age groups, those with young adult relatives who are doing badly financially are notably more likely to support both spending proposals than those with more financially well-off younger relatives and those with no relatives at all. N ('free university education') = 2,088 people aged 40-59 and 2,115 aged 60+. N ('free vocational education') = 2,049 people aged 40-59 and 2,096 aged 60+.

just 40% for those with no close young adult relatives. Among older adults, the difference is particularly stark. Sixty per cent of over-sixties with struggling young adult relatives support more free university education, as opposed to 39% with better-off relatives and just 37% with no close family members in that age cohort. Among middle-aged adults, the well-being of one's younger relatives is only a weak predictor of attitudes to vocational and technical education. Sixty three per cent of those aged

40-59 with struggling young adult relatives support more government provision, versus 60% and 58% of those with well-off and no close young adult family members, respectively. However, the family-related division re-emerges among older adults, among whom there is 74% support for the proposal among those with struggling young adult relatives, but more spending on vocational and technical education is only supported by 64% and 58% of this group who have relatives that are doing well financially or no relatives of this age at all.

Once again, these discrepancies cannot be explained by reference to variation in the objective or subjective wellbeing of the respondents themselves. Amongst our total sample of adults aged 40 and over, there was a 15-point gap between those with young adult relatives doing badly financially and those whose relatives were doing well (57% support v 42% support) on the question of university education. This gap did not shrink at all once we controlled for demographic variables (i.e. the respondents' own incomes, housing tenure and education etc.), and it only declined to 13-points once underlying variation in evaluations of the national economy and one's own personal household finances were taken into account. On the question of increasing spending on vocational and technical education, the initial gap was only 5-points (67% v 62% support), and this was not affected at all by controlling for either of these sets of factors. This is not simply an issue of poorer or more economically insecure parents and grandparents supporting more state spending due to their own circumstances.

Similar patterns may be observed on the question of government expanding the provision of free childcare (**Figure 16**). Overall, 54% of adults polled (including 68% of those under-40) supported this proposal, with support being only slightly lower than average among middle-aged (52%) and older (47%) adults specifically. However, among these two groups, responses were clearly structured by levels of concern about the wellbeing of young adult family members. Sixty one per cent of those aged 40-59 with young adult relatives that were doing badly financially supported the proposal, as opposed to 48 and 43% of this group with well-off and no young adult relatives, respectively. Among those over 60 these figures were 57%, 48% and 36%. Support for increased government provision on childcare would be a lot weaker among the over-40s if this group's familial ties to struggling young adults were a lot weaker or else irrelevant for their attitudes. Differences in levels of support between those over-40 w-

***Figure 16:** Support for Government Spending on Childcare by Age Group and Exposure to Struggling Younger Relatives*



Source: Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.

Note: '*Would you support or oppose increased government spending on the following, even if it leads to increasing taxes or a reduction of spending elsewhere?*... 'increasing free childcare for pre-schoolers'. The potential responses were 'strongly oppose', 'slightly oppose', 'neither support nor oppose', 'slightly support', or 'strongly support'. The figure shows the percentage of respondents that either 'slightly' or 'strongly' supported this proposal. 'Don't know' responses were excluded. Responses are broken down by age group (distinguishing middle-aged, 40-59, and older, 60+, respondents) and evaluations of the average financial wellbeing of one's young adult relatives (see Figure 12). For each age group, the figure displays the overall support for the proposal, and among those who rated their young adult relatives as 'doing badly' (<5/10 for financial wellbeing) or 'doing well' (>5/10) financially, or 'neither' (5), as well as the support amongst those with no close relatives aged 18-39 at all. In both age groups, those with young adult relatives who are doing badly financially are notably more likely to support the proposal than those with more financially well-off younger relatives and those with no relatives at all. N = 2,072 people aged 40-59 and 2,109 aged 60+.

-hose young adult relatives are doing badly financially (60% support) and those whose relatives are doing well (49% support) cannot be explained by variation in the average objective and subjective wellbeing of these two groups. The initial 11-point gap shrinks by only 1 point once demographic factors are controlled for, and by only an additional 1 point once evaluations of the national economy and respondents' own household finances are also held constant.

Middle-aged and older adults with financially precarious younger relatives are clearly more likely to support increased government spending on young adults, but are they likely to prioritise such policies over and above spending on older age cohorts? Studying such trade-offs are important. Whilst an individual might be willing to display familial altruism in a relatively unconstrained setting, it is possible that narrower, self-interest motivations dominate in more realistic scenarios when respondents adjudicate between rival recipients of government investment (Busemeyer and Lober 2020: 427–28; Häusermann et al. 2022; de Mello et al. 2017: 74).[13]

Our survey included several potential young vs old trade-off questions, but the most explicit one asked, '***Some people say that governments should prioritise spending on the needs of younger adults in their late teens, twenties and thirties. Other people say that governments should prioritise spending on the needs of older adults in their sixties, seventies and over. What is your view?*.** Responses to this 'youth prioritisation scale' were coded from 0 ('prioritise younger adults') to 10 ('prioritise older adults'). We classify all of those who responded with either a 6 or above as wanting government to prioritise the needs of older adults over those of people in their late teens, twenties, and thirties.

To what extent do adults over-forty want government to prioritise the needs of those approaching or over retirement age, and do those with struggling younger relatives tend to think differently about this issue? Answers to these questions are found in **Figure 17**, which gives the percentage (excluding 'don't knows') of middle-aged (40-59) and older (60+) respondents who want government to prioritise spending on the over-sixties rather than the under-forties, both overall and by the status of the close young adult relatives of members of these groups. Only a minority of middle-aged adults actively want government to prioritise the needs of the over-sixties (43%), but support for this is clearly higher among those with young adult relatives that are doing well financially (50%) than those whose relatives are doing badly (37%).[14] Those with no you-

[13] This trade-off is clearly sharper for the pool of respondents at or approaching retirement age (60+) rather than the middle-aged (40-59), which is another benefit of dividing our sample in this way.

[14] Overall, across our entire sample, 42% wanted government to prioritise the needs of those in their sixties and over versus only 22% who wanted government to prioritise those aged 18-39

***Figure 17:** Support for Government Prioritising the Needs of Older Adults by Age Group*



Source: Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.

Note: '*Some people say that governments should prioritise spending on the needs of younger adults in their late teens, twenties and thirties. Other people say that governments should prioritise spending on the needs of older adults in their sixties, seventies and over. What is your view:* 0-10 ('prioritise spending on younger adults' to 'prioritise spending on older adults'). The figure shows the percentage of respondents that have a response between 6 and 10, indicating a preference for government to prioritise spending on the needs of older adults in their sixties, seventies, and over, to at least some degree. 'Don't know' responses were excluded. Responses are broken down by age group (distinguishing middle-aged, 40-59, and older, 60+, respondents) and evaluations of the average financial wellbeing of one's young adult relatives (see Figure 12). For each age group, the figure displays the overall support for prioritising the needs of the old over the young, and among those who rated their young adult relatives as 'doing badly' (<5/10 for financial wellbeing) or 'doing well' (>5/10) financially, or 'neither' (5), as well as the support amongst those with no close relatives aged 18-39 at all. In both age groups, those with young adult relatives who are doing badly financially are notably less likely to support prioritising the needs of the old than those with more financially well-off younger relatives and those with no relatives at all. N = 1,886 people aged 40-59 and 1,976 aged 60+.

(the rest wanted to prioritise neither). Young adults (18-39) themselves split 44-22 in favour of prioritising the young over the old, whereas older adults (60+) split 57-10 in the other direction. That said, very few people placed themselves at the furthest end of the scale (i.e. a 0/10 – indicating total prioritisation of youth – or 10/10 – indicating total prioritisation of older adults). Only 18% of older adults specified that they wanted total prioritisation of the over-60s even fewer (8%) of young adults wanted total prioritisation of their own age cohort.

-ng adult relatives at all fall somewhere in between (44%). Amongst older adults, there is a clear majority for prioritising the needs of older adults (57%); however, it is notable that over two-fifths of the over-sixties do not feel this way. Furthermore, older adults with struggling younger family members respond differently to this question. Only a minority (46%) of this group want government to prioritise the needs of their own age cohort, as opposed to 61% and 60% of those whose relatives are doing well or those who have no young adult relatives at all, respectively.

Once again, these differences cannot be explained by reference to characteristics of the older relatives themselves. The initial 16-point gap in support for prioritising the over-sixties between adults aged 40 and over with younger relatives that are doing badly (40%) or well (56%) only declines to a 14-point gap once adjusting for variation between these two groups in terms of the variables measuring demographic factors and evaluations of the national economy and own household finances described earlier.

This does suggest that 'grey power' theories of self-interested older voters may eventually be subject to a law of diminishing returns. The more resources that are concentrated on older adults, the worse-off younger adults may become. And the more badly-off younger adults there are, the greater the number of older voters with struggling relatives who will push for an end to a policy of disproportionate investment in the over-sixties.

Our finding that adults with struggling younger relatives tend to want government to prioritise spending on the young over the old is not an artefact of our use of a somewhat abstract survey question. Elsewhere in our survey, we asked respondents, '***Suppose the government was going to spend more money in three of the following areas. Which would you prioritise? Please select three***', followed by a list of 10, randomly ordered, areas for potential increased investment. These areas were 1) State pensions, 2) Free adult social care for the elderly, 3) Free public transport for pensioners, 4) Winter fuel allowances for pensioners, 5) Building more affordable houses, 6) Free childcare services for pre-schoolers, 7) Free vocational or technical education for non-University students, 8) Free education for University students, 9) Increasing the amount of new solar/wind/tidal energy projects, 10) Investing money in the UK's border force to make it more effective. We classified items 1-4 as 'policies aimed at older adults', items 5-8 as 'policies aimed at younger adults', and items 9-10 as 'miscellaneous policies'. Therefore, since older respondents were given three choices but had four items favouring their own cohort on the menu, it would have been perfectly possible for them to choose not a single young adult-oriented policy on offer.

Figure 18 displays the percentage of respondents that chose to prioritise 'more affordable housing' specifically, and at least one of the four 'policies aimed at young adults' (i.e. housing, childcare, vocational or university education) in their three picks. This is especially interesting considering the prominence given to the housing crisis in discussions of intergenerational inequality and the challenges facing younger adults in Britain (Broome et al 2022; Dickson 2022; Timperley 2020). Responses are broken down by age group (distinguishing middle-aged, 40-59, and older, 60+, respondents) and evaluations of the average financial wellbeing of one's young adult relatives.

Affordable housing was chosen as a top-three priority by a majority (53%) of our respondents aged 18-39 (not displayed); however, almost 2-in-5 (39%) middle-aged respondents, and over 1-in-3 (36%) older respondents also selected this option. The latter result is particularly notable, as only 20% of our sample of those aged 60 and over were non-property owners themselves. A significant number choose to prioritise housing even though they themselves would appear to have little need of additional construction and potentially (through threats to their own property values) something to lose. One reason for this level of demand for more housing among those in their forties, fifties and beyond would appear to be familial considerations. Forty seven per cent and 46% of middle-aged and older adults with financially struggling younger relatives, respectively, chose to prioritise affordable housing. This is compared to just 33% and 34% of adults in the same two age cohorts whose relatives were instead doing well in financial terms. Pooling all respondents over 40, there is a 13-point gap in the percentage of respondents with relatives doing very badly and those with relatives doing well who chose to prioritise building more affordable houses (47% v 34%). This gap remains at 13-points even after adjusting for the demographics and evaluations of the national economy and respondents' household finances through the same sort of

***Figure 18:** Support for Government Prioritising Policies Aimed at Young Adults by Age Group and Exposure to Struggling Younger Relatives*



Source: Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.

Note: Respondents were asked, '*Suppose the government was going to spend more money in three of the following areas. Which would you prioritise? Please select three:'* 1) State pensions, 2) Free adult social care for the elderly, 3) Free public transport for pensioners, 4) Winter fuel allowances for pensioners, 5) Building more affordable houses, 6) Free childcare services for pre-schoolers, 7) Free vocational or technical education for non-University students, 8) Free education for University students, 9) Increasing the amount of new solar/wind/tidal energy projects, 10) Investing money in the UK's border force to make it more effective. (Note that the order of these items was randomised for each respondent). We classified items 1-4 as 'policies aimed at older adults', items 5-8 as 'policies aimed at younger adults', and items 9-10 as 'miscellaneous policies'. The figure shows the percentage of respondents that chose to prioritise 'more affordable housing' specifically, and at least one of the 4 'policies aimed at young adults' (i.e. housing, childcare, vocational or university education) in their 3 picks. 'Don't know' responses were excluded. Responses are broken down by age group (distinguishing middle-aged, 40-59, and older, 60+, respondents) and evaluations of the average financial wellbeing of one's young adult relatives (see Figure 12). In both age groups, those with young adult relatives who are doing badly financially are notably more likely to prioritise affordable housing or one of the other 3 policies aimed at young adults. N = 2,081 people aged 40-59 and 2,139 aged 60+.

multiple regressions described previously. That is to say, the reason that older adults with struggling younger relatives choose to prioritise affordable homes cannot be explained by reference to their own levels of objective or subjective economic insecurity.

Overall, 70% of middle-aged respondents and 60% of older respondents chose to prioritise at least one of the four policies aimed at young adults (as did 85% of young adults themselves, and 70% of all our respondents overall). Among the middle-aged, prioritisation of at least one pro-youth policy ranged from 78% of those with financially struggling younger relatives to 66% of those whose relatives were doing well. Amongst older adults, the bigger gap was between those with financially struggling younger relatives (70%) and those with no young adult relatives at all (55%). Once again, these gaps are robust to controlling for the demographics of the respondents themselves as well as their evaluations of the national economy and their own household finances.

Whilst the main story of this section has been about how concern for the well-being of one's younger relatives does tend to increase intergenerational generosity among middle-aged and older adults, it should be emphasised that prioritising spending on services predominantly benefiting younger adults – housing, childcare, and tertiary education – does appear to enjoy a lot of support from a substantially larger portion of the over-40 electorate. Contrary to popular belief, middle-aged and older adults do not appear to have an appetite for concentrating government revenue only upon themselves.

As a further example of the power of familial considerations, we can consider the results from a survey question that gave respondents a direct trade-off between goods for the young and goods for the old. We asked respondents, '***How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?...The government should increase spending on education, even if that means cutting back spending in other areas such as pensions***', with responses measured on a 5-point scale from 'strongly disagree' to 'strongly agree'. Getting the public to agree to a proposal to cut back on pensions spending, whatever the extra revenue would be used for, is a very hard task. Providing a decent standard of living for the elderly is usually one of the most popular functions of government (Curtice 2017). Unsurprisingly, only 23% of respondents backed this proposal, with only 35% of young adults (18-39) agreeing or strongly agreeing with it. Support was understandably low amongst adults at, or approaching the state pension age (only 14% of over-sixties supported the proposal). However, support amongst adults aged 60+ was considerably higher among those with younger relatives that were doing badly financially (22%) than those whose relatives were doing well (13%) or those who had no close relatives aged 18-39 at all (10%). These gaps were robust to controlling for the usual set of background factors described in this section. Even with a relatively extreme proposal such as this one, considerations of the wellbeing of one's young adult can still make a difference at the margins.

Overall, when asked about their opinions on specific issues concerning investment in the younger generation, middle-aged (40-59) and older (60+) adults appear a lot more generous than they are often caricatured as being. A major reason for this is the role of family considerations. Support for policies like free childcare and tertiary education, as well as expanding the supply of affordable and council housing, is more common amongst middle-aged and older adults who have young adult relatives that are doing badly economically than those who do not. As is the extent to which these sorts of 'pro-youth' policies are actively prioritised. The evidence that we have presented here allows for the possibility that the major British political parties might, in fact, be able to appeal to older voters by promising to improve the wellbeing of their younger relatives (see Hutton (2021) and (Duffy 2021) for similar predictions). At the very least, it suggests that a party that initially wins votes by concentrating public spending on older groups might soon find itself facing diminishing, or even negative, returns if that investment comes at the expense of those voters' younger relatives. Is there any evidence that this sort of political realignment might have been happening below the surface of British politics as of August 2022? In the next section, we investigate this and show how the vote intentions of middle-aged and older adults can be predicted by their assessments of their younger relatives' financial circumstances.

Section 5: How is the voting intention of people with young relatives that are struggling financially affected?

In recent elections, the Conservatives have done very well amongst voters in their forties, fifties and, in particular, sixties and beyond, which has compensated for their unprecedentedly weak showing amongst young adults (Chrisp and Pearce 2019; Green 2021). However, could the party have an emerging problem amongst the relatives of struggling young adults? Conversely, might Labour be able to increase their support by convincing the parents and grandparents of financially precarious young adults that they are best able to safeguard the wellbeing of their loved ones?

Voters exposed to a struggling young relative might shun the Conservative party for two reasons. The first is because, as an incumbent party, they may be deemed responsible for any negative financial outcomes that occur, as in traditional economic voting models in political science (Duch and Stevenson 2008; Kramer 1971; Tilley, Neundorf, and Hobolt 2018). The second is because the party are frequently criticised in the media for their record on improving the wellbeing of young adults (Duncan 2023; Fisher 2022; Pickard 2019; Toynbee 2021) and, possibly as a result, Labour enjoys a polling lead in terms of perceived ability to represent the interests of younger people (Grant, Green, and Evans 2022).

Can we detect a family-centric economic vote against the Conservatives and in favour of Labour?

To test this, we asked our survey respondents, '***If there were a general election held tomorrow, which party would you vote for?***'. For the purpose of the following analysis, we exclude respondents who were unsure who they would support as well as those not intending to vote at the next election. **Figure 19** gives the percentage of middle-aged (40-59) and older (60+) respondents currently intending to vote for the Conservatives (blue) and Labour (red). We present both the average support for the two parties within these different age groups (dashed bars), and the support amongst those with different levels of exposure to struggling young adult relatives. Those who rated the average financial wellbeing of their 'close family members in their late teens, twenties and thirties' as between 0 and 4 out of 10 were classified as having young relatives 'doing badly' financially. Ratings between 6 and 10 were taken to mean having relatives 'doing

Figure 19: Vote Intentions for Labour and the Conservative Party by Age Group and Exposure to Struggling Younger Relatives





Source: Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.

Note: Respondents were asked '*If there were a general election held tomorrow, which party would you vote for?*'. This figure shows the percentage of respondents that replied either 'Conservative' or 'Labour', excluding those who indicated that they 'would not vote' or 'don't know' who they would vote for. Responses are broken down by age group (distinguishing middle-aged, 40-59, and older, 60+, respondents) and evaluations of the average financial wellbeing of one's young adult relatives (see Figure 12). For each age group, the figure displays the overall support for either party, and among those who rated their young adult relatives as 'doing badly' (<5/10 for financial wellbeing) or 'doing well' (>5/10) financially, or 'neither' (5), as well as the support amongst those with no close relatives aged 18-39 at all. In both age groups, those with young adult relatives who are doing badly financially are notably less likely to support the Conservatives and more likely to support Labour than the average person of their age. N = 1,422 people aged 40-59 and 1,598 aged 60+.

well'. Ratings of 5 indicated young adult relatives doing neither badly nor well. Finally, those who did not submit a rating because they did not have close young adult relatives were classified as a final, separate group.

At the time of our survey in August 2022, Labour were ahead 14 points (42% v 28%) among middle-aged adults, whereas they trailed the Conservatives by 20 points (28% v 48%) among older adults. However, things look different when we break these two groups down depending on the perceived wellbeing of their young adult relatives. Beginning with those in their forties and fifties, Labour led the Conservatives by a huge 26 points (47% to 21%) among those who felt that their young adult relatives were doing badly financially. By contrast, among those who felt that their young adult relatives were doing well, Labour was actually two points behind (35% to 37%). Interestingly, whilst in our investigation of policy preferences we discovered that those with no close young adult relatives tended to be considerably less keen on spending on young adult-oriented policies than those with financially precarious relatives, we find very little difference between these two groups in terms of vote choice. Labour enjoy only a slightly smaller lead of 20 points (45% v 25%) among this group. It may be that middle-aged adults without close young relatives are disproportionately attracted to Labour for reasons other than familial considerations. They might be (among the middle-aged) disproportionately younger and more socially liberal, making them less likely to have had children of their own. The wellbeing of one's relatives is obviously not the only factor that drives vote choice, but the suggestion from our results so far is consistent with it potentially playing some role. Among older adults the association between vote choice and evaluations of one's younger relatives is stronger. Uniquely, among those who feel their young adult family members are doing badly, Labour has a small 2-point lead over the Conservatives (37% v 35%). However, among those who feel their younger relatives are doing well, Labour trails by 27-points (25% v 52%), and among those with no close young adult relatives at all they are all of 30-points behind (22% v 52%).

One possibility is that a shared social background could be what is driving the above association between the wellbeing of one's family members and one's vote choice. To test this, we implemented a multinomial logistic regression predicting respondents vote intention at the time of our survey.[15] We used our model to predict vote intention on the basis of evaluations of one's young adult family members, after controlling for a wide range of other factors.[16] In addition to the social background of the parents or grandparents (etc.), we include a control for how the respondent voted in the 2016 EU Referendum, since attitudes to the EU have recently been one of the most robust predictors of party support (Fieldhouse et al 2020; Sobolewska and Ford 2020).

The full results can be viewed in **Appendix C**, but for ease of interpretation in **Figure 20** we display marginal effects derived from our models that estimate the predicted probability (as well as the 95% confidence intervals for each estimate) that a given middle-aged or older voter intends to vote either Conservative (blue) or Labour (red) based on their evaluations of the average wellbeing of their young adult relatives. The dashed lines show how the probability of a vote for either party is predicted to change based on how well the respondent believes that their relative is doing. This is the predicted size of the association when no statistical controls are included in the model. The solid lines, in contrast, give the predicted probability of the respondent supporting either party once the full set of control variables has been held constant.

The financial wellbeing of young adult relatives is a good predictor of the vote choice of middle-aged and older relatives, and this is not driven by some background factor related to shared social class or the respondents' evaluations of the national economy, or their own finances. There is also clearly an association even after Brexit preferences are adjusted for. The relationship is also quite a large one. Net of controls, a middle-aged voter with the most positive evaluation of their young adult relatives' finances has a 38% likelihood (i.e. a probability of 0.38) of choosing the Conservatives, and a 34% likelihood of choosing Labour. However, among middle-aged adults with the most negative evaluation of their young adult relatives' finances, the likelihood of support for the Conservatives falls to 16% and the likelihood of Labour support rises to 53%. An

[15] For simplification, we distinguished support for the incumbent Conservative Party (1), the largest opposition party, Labour (2), and any other opposition party (3).

[16] Most of the control variables are the same factors that we described in previous sections of our report: respondents' own financial outlook and national economic outlook, as well as their age, gender, level of education, household income, employment status, housing tenure and value, region, and occupational class.

Figure 20: *Support for Labour and the Conservative Party by Age Group, Predicted by Evaluations of Younger Relatives' Finances*



Source: Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.

Notes: The figure is based on a multinomial regression model predicting the vote choice of respondents in our survey (see Appendix C). The coloured lines show that the probability of an intended Conservatives (blue) and Labour (red) vote varies depending on evaluations of the financial wellbeing of one's close young relatives aged 18-39, measured on a scale between 0 ('doing very well') to 10 ('doing very badly'). This is the same variable as in the previous figures, but here it has been reverse-coded for presentation purposes. We present how the probability of a certain vote choice shifts based on evaluations of one's younger relatives both when no other factors are controlled for (dotted lines), and in controlling for a list of factors also known to predict vote choice. These controls are respondents': 1) subjective evaluation of own household finances (1-9); 2) subjective evaluation of the national economy (1-9); 3) 2016 EU referendum vote choice; 4) age, 5) gender; 6) level of education; 7) logged equivalised household income; 8) working status; 9) housing tenure and value; 10) region; 11) National Statistics Socioeconomic Class. Note that the percentages indicate the size of group with a given evaluation of their younger relatives' wellbeing. One can clearly see that, in both the models with controls and without, respondents' that believe that their younger relatives are doing worse financially are predicted to be more likely to support Labour and less likely to support the Conservatives. N = 913 people aged 40-59 and 1,116 aged 60+.

older voter with the most positive evaluation of their young adult relatives' finances has a 54% likelihood (i.e. a probability of 0.54) of choosing the Conservatives, and a 19% likelihood of choosing Labour. However, among middle-aged adults with the most negative evaluation of their young adult relatives' finances, the likelihood of support for the Conservatives falls to 39%, and the likelihood of Labour support rises to 35%.

Overall, middle-aged (40-59) and older (60+) voters with financially precarious younger family members are, to varying degrees, more likely to support Labour than the Conservative Party. The increase in support for Labour among those with struggling young relatives cannot be explained by reference to the wellbeing of the middle-aged or older voters themselves. The relationship also remains even after accounting for respondents' support for Brexit, which was one of the best predictors of vote choice in the 2019 General Election outcome (Fieldhouse et al. 2021). That is to say, this is not simply a case of the Conservatives having a blind spot with poorer or Remain-supporting voters over-forty. It appears that, more generally, they may be being punished by Generation X and Baby Boomer adults who, regardless of their wellbeing or attitudes on other salient issues, have serious concerns about their younger relatives and want something to be done about it.

That said, whilst it is possible that evaluations of the wellbeing of one's younger relatives may increasingly disrupt these patterns, on average young and old do still remain distinct in their voting behaviour. **Figure 19** indicates that, as of August 2022, voters over-60 still back the Conservatives over Labour by 48 points to 28. By contrast, among the under-forties, Labour were comfortably in the lead, by 55 points to 11. Would it be possible for a party to narrow this age divide by speaking to the concerns of those at different ends of the age distribution? What would a manifesto have to look like to attempt this? In the next section we describe an innovative conjoint experiment that attempted to answer these questions, and highlight areas of consensus and contention between the generations.

Section 6: What would an intergenerational policy consensus look like?

In light of the previous evidence, we might ask just how polarised young and old really are on policy interventions designed to improve the wellbeing of people at different ends of the age spectrum.

Given that the vote choice of young and old has moved so far apart in recent elections (Chrisp and Pearce 2019; Green 2021), it is often assumed that it would be difficult for a party to formulate an election programme that could speak convincingly to issues facing people at different ends of the life cycle (Bell and Gardiner 2019). Whilst conventional survey questionnaires, in which individuals are asked to express the extent of their support for particular policy proposals or select a few favourites from a small list of options, do provide a counterpoint to some extent, we might worry how well these sorts of polls predict actual behaviour at the ballot box. We have shown some evidence that older adults are more supportive of policies aimed at younger adults than we might think. When it comes to election day, however, can we really be confident that they will not simply focus all of their attention on the offers related to pensions, social care etc., and disregard party stances on matters like housing and education?

Conventional survey questions can only imperfectly replicate the sort of forced-choice between different sets of policies that elections offer. In real life, a voter must choose the manifesto that they like best on average (while also considering other non-policy considerations such as approval of different party leaders), rather than vote each specific proposal up or down, or 'pick and mix' their favourite policies from a range of different parties' stances. An alternative form of polling that better reflects the task facing voters at elections is the 'conjoint' experiment. In these exercises, respondents are asked to consider 'bundles' of outcomes as a whole. That is, they must consider a manifesto package that includes a large number of different policy areas within it, with the specific features of those policy areas (e.g. whether to increase pension spending or decrease investment in housing) randomly varied. Respondents are shown two rival manifestos at a time and must decide which one they like best. The task inherently forces them to prioritise the policy areas they really care about when making a decision.[17] Crucially, this then allows us to ascertain which particular policy areas and features were most consequential for respondents' ultimate decision, and whether this differed between subgroups (i.e. younger and older people). Our results, therefore, have to be understood as the policy preferences held by respondents on a given set of issues when all of the policies are weighed together as a package. We gain a considerable amount of knowledge about the relative importance of different policy features to different groups by asking our sample to engage directly with the difficult trade-offs involved in similar decisions at the ballot box.

Figure 21 provides a list of the policy areas that were discussed in the fictional manifestos that we presented to our respondents, as well as the list of policy features (i.e. attributes) that could be randomly assigned to them within a particular manifesto. To keep the task manageable, we restricted our manifestos to covering only six different policy areas. Two of these, the state pension and elderly social care, concerned sections of public policy that involve spending on older adults; another two, housing development and post-18 education, concerned topics that more commonly mean investment in those in their late teens, twenties and thirties. In each manifesto, each of these policy areas could be paired with a proposal to either stick with current policies on the issue (i.e. 'no new policies'), or increase or decrease spending on the subject matter, as well as more specific suggestions of how this might be achieved. For instance, reductions in spending on elderly social care might be met by reducing government subsidies overall (i.e. 'elderly pay more themselves') or through a form of means testing related to one's assets (i.e. 'elderly homeowners pay more themselves'). Similarly, depending on the exact policy allocated, increases in spending on housing might be used for investment in 'affordable housing', 'council housing', or 'affordable housing for first-time buyers'. This allows us to compare the relative popularity of more specific policy proposals, rather than just more vague statements on greater or lesser investment in a given area.

[17] This also allows us to avoid problems of social desirability bias which might plague conventional polling. As we are not observing any one individual's stated attitudes to specific proposals like cutting pensions or investment in housing, only their overall decision on which of two rival packages to approve, respondents are under less pressure to perform certain expressions of support for spending on others.

Figure 21: *Full List of Possible Policy Features Available in the Conjoint Experiment*

Policy Areas	Policy Features
State Pension	• No new policies (i.e. 'Pensions Status Quo') • **Increase spending** – lower the pension age • **Increase spending** – increase the Basic Pension • **Increase spending** – increase the Basic Pension for renters • **Reduce spending** – raise pension age to 67 • **Reduce spending** – decrease the Basic Pension • **Reduce spending** – decrease the Basic Pension for homeowners
Elderly Social Care	• No new policies (i.e. 'Care Status Quo') • **Reduce spending** – elderly pay more themselves • **Reduce spending** – elderly homeowners pay more themselves • **Increase spending** – elderly pay less themselves • **Increase spending** – elderly renters pay less themselves
Housing Development	• No new policies (i.e. 'Housing Status Quo') • **Reduce spending** • **Increase spending** on affordable housing • **Increase spending** on council housing • **Increase spending** on affordable housing for first-time buyers
Post-18 Education	• No new policies (i.e. 'Education Status Quo') • **Reduce spending** – less support for university students • **Reduce spending** – less support for technical/vocational students • **Increase spending** – more support for university students • **Increase spending** – more support for technical/vocational students
Immigration	• No new policies (i.e. 'Immigration Status Quo') • **Increase immigration** – make entry easier • **Reduce immigration** – make entry more difficult
Environment	• No new policies (i.e. 'Environment Status Quo') • **Increase spending** – more new solar/wind/tidal energy projects • **Reduce spending** – fewer newer solar/wind/tidal energy projects

Note: The full list of policy areas and potential policies from the conjoint experiment (Figure 17). Whenever a policy package was generated, each category of policy would be randomly assigned one (and only one) of the features listed on the right. The order of the policy package categories was also randomly ordered between each respondent (i.e. the state pension category was not at the top for every respondent). This reduces the risk of 'profile ordering effects' wherein certain features are deemed more important because they are presented first or last.

The final two policy areas concern issues that are not directly related to investment in a particular age cohort or another but involve stances on two issues that have become increasingly important in British politics in recent years: immigration and the environment (Sobolewska and Ford 2020; Kenny 2022). Including statements related to these two issues in our experiment allows us to benchmark the extent of intergenerational polarisation around issues such as pensions and housing with two other major political questions that have been shown to divide old and young[18]. If we find much greater age divisions on questions about government investment across the life cycle, this would suggest that the observed age divides in vote choice, seen in recent elections, are more likely to be about sociocultural issues than a desire to concentrate government investment on one's own generation to the detriment of others.

Respondents were shown a series of four different pairs of manifestos and were asked to choose which one of the two they liked best (there was no 'don't know' option).[19] The instructions given to the respondents, alongside an example screenshot of what they then saw, is given in **Figure 22**.

Following good practice on the analysis of subgroup preferences in conjoint experiments (Leeper, Hobolt, and Tilley 2020),[20] we use the data from respondents to calculate simple marginal means for each of the policy features described above. These numbers do not indicate the raw amount of support for particular policies (as in the co-

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[18] Recent YouGov polls underline this. In May 2023, an average of 79% of those aged 65 and over felt that immigration had been too high during the last decade, as opposed to 30% of those aged 18-24 (YouGov 2023b). In the same month, when asked how well the government was finding a balance between renewables and fossil fuels, an equal percentage (24%) of over-65s said that the government was putting too much emphasis on renewables as said they were placing too much enough emphasis on fossil fuels (YouGov 2023c). In contrast, 18-24 year olds were much more likely to claim too much emphasis on fossil fuels (44%) than too much emphasis on renewables (11%).

[19] In total, 6,021 respondents were randomly exposed to 24,084 pairs of policy packages, giving us 12,042 'forced choice' decisions. Younger respondents (18-39) collectively rated 6,252 pairs of policy packages (3,126 decisions), and older respondents (60+) rated 8,744 (4,372).

[20] We carried out our analysis using a specialised R package, 'cregg', for calculating marginal means in a subgroup analysis (Leeper, Hobolt, and Tilley 2020). This is deemed superior to calculating average marginal component effects (AMCEs) for each feature, as it avoids the issue of having to pick one policy feature as the (potential arbitrary) reference category. Marginal means have a simple, intuitive interpretation and, because they are purely descriptive, they require no additional modelling decisions.

Figure 22: *Conjoint Experiment Preamble and Example Vignette*

YouGov

Recently, some researchers have been trying to come up with **policy proposals that would improve conditions in Britain**. They would like to know your thoughts on them.

You will be presented with four pairs of policy packages. For each pair, **please select which one you prefer** as a whole. You may like both or neither, but please chose the one you like the most overall.

These packages may differ quite a bit. Imagine that the packages are like manifestos for political parties where you **decide whether or not you like the package as a whole** rather than individual items. Lastly, please remember that **proposals for extra spending may require tax rises or spending cuts** elsewhere.

Policy Area	Policy Package A	Policy Package B
Immigration	**Reduce immigration** – make entry more difficult	**Increase immigration** – make entry easier
Post-18 Education	**Increase spending** – more support for technical/vocational students	**Reduce spending** – less support for University students
State Pension	**Reduce spending** – decrease the Basic Pension	No new policies
Housing Development	**Increase spending** on affordable housing	**Reduce spending**
Environment	**Reduce spending** – fewer new solar/wind/tidal energy projects	**Increase spending** – more new solar/wind/tidal energy projects
Elderly Social Care	**Increase spending** – elderly pay less themselves	**Increase spending** – elderly pay less themselves

Which policy package do you prefer?

- Package A
- Package B

Note: The instructions given to the respondents participating in our conjoint experiment, alongside an example of a randomly generated ‘pair’ of manifestos that they were asked to choose between. Note that the policy areas were ordered randomly (from top to bottom) between respondents, but not within them. Each respondent went through the task 4 times, and thus were asked to choose between 4 pairs of randomly generated policy packages in total.

-nventional public opinion polling described in Figures 8-12). Respondents were not asked to evaluate individual features – they were only asked to make judgments of bundles of policies. The values that we present are the preferences that are revealed by their choices between these bundles. This value represents the average probability that a manifesto is preferred by a respondent when the given policy in question features on it. Alternatively, it is equally valid to interpret them as the proportion of respondents that would accept or reject a manifesto that included that particular policy. As a proportion, the marginal mean [MM] associated with each policy can run between 0 and 1. A policy scoring 0 would always lead to the rejection of any manifesto that it appeared on. Respondents would trade-off everything else to avoid it. By contrast, a policy scoring 1 would always lead to the acceptance of any manifesto that it appeared on: respondents would trade-off everything else to have that policy in the overall bundle, regardless of whatever other combination of policies that bundle contained. A policy with a score of 0.5 would lie exactly in between, signifying that respondents were largely indifferent to it. Fifty per cent of the time they would accept it, and 50% of the time they would reject it. It can be said, therefore, that such a policy makes no real difference to the popularity of a manifesto that it appears on.

Overall, which policy statements were most consequential for determining whether or not one of our fictional manifestos was selected? **Figure 23** provides a plot that shows estimates of the effects of the randomly assigned policy features on the probability of a policy package being preferred by respondents, as well as the associated 95% confidence interval for each estimate. Policy features that have confidence intervals which overlap by 0.5 do not systematically alter the probability of selection in either direction to a statistically significant degree. Because coefficients have been calculated separately for those under-40 and those over-60, we can examine which policy areas older and younger people disagree on.

Overall, most of the policies that typically involve distributing either a greater or lesser number of resources to those in different age cohorts – i.e. those related to pensions, elderly care, housing, and education – do not tend to divide young and old. In nearly all cases, policies related to these four areas tend to yield marginal means that are above or below 0.5 for both those under 40 and those over 60. That is to say, they either increase or decrease the popularity of the particular manifesto they appear on (or else make no difference) among both groups simultaneously. In general, both young and old tend to prefer spending more on pensions in order to lower the state pension age and increasing the state pension for all (which is more popular than doing so just for homeowners). They both also tend to reject reductions in the value of the state pension (even if this is means tested on the basis of homeownership or not), although the old are more ambivalent about a future raise in the state pension age itself. Similarly, spending more on elderly care is popular among both groups; reducing expenditure is

Figure 23: *Conjoint Experiment of Government Spending Preferences: Younger and Older Adults*



Source: Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.

Note: Conjoint experiment results for younger (18-39) and older (60+) adults in our sample. N = 1,563 people aged 18-39 and 2,186 people aged 60 and over. Note that those aged 40-59 are in between the under-40s and over-60s on most issues, and those with struggling younger relatives once again seem more enthusiastic about increased investment in vocational-technical education than others (see **Appendix D**).

not. When it comes to housing, both groups dislike the status quo (suggesting mutual recognition of their being a problem surrounding this issue) or the prospect of government spending less on the issue, and both groups are more apt to support a manifesto that promises to raise spending on affordable housing for first-time buyers, which is noteworthy. The young are also enthusiastic about promises to increase spending on affordable housing in general, although the (positive) coefficient for the over-sixties cannot statistically be distinguished from ambivalence. Conversely, however, older respondents are attracted by a promise to increase state spending on council housing, whereas the young are actually ambivalent and even (mildly) put-off by this promise. On post-18 education, there is an intergenerational consensus on the need to increase spending on vocational and technical education, however, promises to increase spending on university education prove divisive, attracting the young but repelling the old.

Even when support for a proposal does not differ in kind (i.e. having a positive effect for one age group and a negative effect for the other), there are often quite large gaps in the degree to which certain policies yield acceptance or rejection of any manifesto that they feature on. For instance, 65% of respondents aged 60 or over tend to approve a manifesto when it features a commitment to increasing the basic state pension (i.e. the marginal mean [MM] = 0.65], as opposed to 54% of those aged 18-39 [MM = 0.54]. Similarly, the commitment to spending more on affordable housing for first-time buyers leads to around 55% of those under-40 supporting a manifesto containing this promise, but only 52% of those over-60.

Considering the other two policy areas, our manifesto stances on the environment do not polarise old and young. Manifestos that pledge support for the status quo on renewables, as well as spending less on them, tend to be less popular among both the under-forties and the over-sixties. In contrast, manifestos that promise to spend more on renewables tend to be much more popular, and around 59% and 55% of manifestos with this pledge were approved by younger and older respondents, respectively. In contrast, policies on immigration are somewhat more divisive. Explicit pledges to reduce rates of immigration by making entry more difficult tend to strongly increase older adults' support for manifestos that make this commitment, but this is not the case for younger voters. Under-40s are actually ever so slightly less likely to support a manifesto with a commitment to reducing immigration, however, this result is only narrowly statistically distinguishable from ambivalence. Pledges to increase immigration by making entry easier yield clear reductions in support for manifestos among the over-sixties, and a borderline reduction in support among the under-forties, although this result is not statistically distinguishable from ambivalence). Overall, it would appear status quo pledges on immigration, rather than calls to make entry significantly easier or harder, appear to generate the highest amount of consensus among old and young.

Despite fears to the contrary (Bell and Gardiner 2019), there may be more space for an intergenerational political consensus than is often realised. Both older and younger voters are likely to support manifestos that offer support to those at the opposite ends of the age spectrum. Specifically, promises to increase the value of the state pension, the amount of free elderly care that each adult can receive, the amount of affordable housing available to first time buyers, and the amount of free technical and vocational education all seem to generate varying degrees of intergenerational consensus. In addition to continued evidence for support among older adults for certain types of investment in the younger generation. This exercise has also demonstrated that, despite concerns that the young have been losing out to the retired in recent government budgets (Cunliffe 2021; Duncan 2023; Fisher 2022; Sandher 2021; Toynbee 2021, 2023), there is little enthusiasm among the young for reducing expenditure on older groups in general, nor implementing means testing based on homeownership. True, there are some differences in the degree of responsiveness between old and young regarding more spending on pensions (which has a greater impact on the older generation) or affordable housing (which has a greater impact on the young), and university education appears more polarising a subject in the conjoint exercise than it did in conventional polling but, by and large, the responses of young and old on age-related issues do tend to differ in degree rather than in kind. Greater state spending on renewable energy projects also emerges as an area of consensus, however, there appears to be more division surrounding immigration, where the old are attracted by promises of further restrictions whereas younger adults are (mildly) put off.

The next section brings our report to a close by summarising all of our major findings and offering recommendations for politicians and political parties looking to building greater intergenerational political consensus.

Lessons Learned from Our Analysis

This report has demonstrated that middle-aged (40-59) and older (60+) British voters with financially struggling young adult (18-39) relatives have different political attitudes and behaviours from those that do not. Such citizens demonstrate greater levels of support for young adult oriented policies such as government investment in education, childcare, and housing; they are less likely to demand that government prioritise the needs of the old over the young; and they are more likely to vote against the incumbent party. These results are not reducible to older voters' own subjective or objective economic position (which would instead suggest the role of shared socioeconomic class), nor their perceptions of the national economy, alongside various other potential confounders. Rather, they occur because such people value the wellbeing of their financially precarious young family members, and tend to consider their wellbeing as important to their own happiness and feelings of security

Using a large original dataset, novel survey items tapping youth-orientated policy preferences, trade-offs between spending on old and young, and family-centric economic voting, as well as a conjoint experiment, our results help us better understand the political implications of ageing democracies. They provide a more optimistic story than the 'grey power' (Chrisp and Pearce 2019; Vlandas 2022) or 'gerontocracy' (Berry 2012; Sinn and Uebelmesser 2003) interpretations in which older adults use their electoral weight to tilt state investment ever further towards themselves at the expense of the young. On the basis of this evidence, present trends towards greater intergenerational inequality (Broome et al. 2022; Flynn 2020; Rahman and Tomlinson 2018) may ultimately prove somewhat self-correcting once enough older voters are faced with a struggling young son, daughter or grandchild. Our results imply that politicians seeking to advocate for more spending on housing, education and other policies targeted primarily on younger generations would do well to appeal to older voters based on their children's and wider families' interests. We now have concrete evidence for what others (Duffy 2021; Hutton 2021) have hinted at previously: family matters for politics.

This report has identified what could become a crucial constituency at the next election. Around 17% of the total electorate are aged 40-and-over and have close young relatives that are doing badly financially (Section 3). This is equivalent to almost 8 million potential voters as of December 2021 (ONS 2022), which is, for comparison, roughly twice the size of the total population of the 'Red Wall'[21]. This hidden electorate – who we term the 'family fortunes voters' – has most likely increased in size as the cost-of-living crisis has ramped up since our survey last Autumn (Broome, Handscomb, and Try 2023).

Given continued poor electoral performances for the Conservatives among younger voters (Burn-Murdoch 2022), this should be especially worrying for the Conservative party. They may incur a 'double punishment' for increasing economic insecurity during the cost of living crisis. A failure to raise the average level of wellbeing among younger adults may not just harm the party among Millennials and 'Gen Z'; it might also cost them votes from their parents and grandparents. Conversely, Labour looks set to profit from these trends if it can maintain assessments of it as a competent potential governing party and a strong vehicle for the representation of young people's interests (Grant, Green, and Evans 2022). This is particularly likely if 'cultural' issues that strongly polarise voters by age — such as Brexit (Sobolewska and Ford 2020) — slide down the public agenda in favour of 'economic' issues, upon which ourselves and others (Ansell 2023a; O'Grady 2022) have shown generational attitudinal divides tend to be considerably weaker. This appears to be happening given that Britons of all ages are now considerably more likely to cite 'the economy' and 'the cost of living' as political priorities than immigration, asylum and Britain's exit from the EU (Smith 2022), and as Labour has gained a sizeable lead among voters of working age as of June 2023 (YouGov 2023a). We note, however, that Labour would not be assumed to win the support of *all* older voters, but rather to win greater support among those for whom either they or their close younger family members are financially struggling. That said, the group of potential 'family fortunes voters' that we identified is not insubstantial and, in light of the intensification of the cost-of-living crisis in the intervening months (Broome, Handscomb, and Try 2023), its size has likely only grown since our August 2022 survey.

[21] The ONS (2021c) estimate that the 42 parliamentary constituencies in the English north and midlands that were identified as part of the Red Wall by James Kangasooriam (Kangasoorium and Simon 2021) had a combined population of 4.1 million, as of mid-2020. We acknowledge that membership in these groups will overlap with our own group of 'family fortunes voters'.

We have several other recommendations for parties seeking to win older voters to the cause of improved living standards for young adults. Our findings, particularly those from the conjoint experiment, reveal that older voters are more sympathetic to increased investment in vocational and technical education than they are towards university education. They also seem to demonstrate greater support for more housing projects in their local area when it is specified that these new buildings will be 'affordable' or, in particular, 'council' housing, than when these frames are absent. Our broader findings point to a possible reason for this: those with struggling relatives will want to maximise their own family member's chances of being able to access and benefit from these constructions. If they perceive that these houses will tend to benefit (potentially wealthy) 'outsiders' moving into their communities, concerns about overstretching local infrastructure and amenities may predominate instead (Ansell 2023).

Our report holds lessons for young people's advocates. Whilst it is true that we identify concerns for younger generations, there are important nuances in people's agreements with differently worded propositions. Based on our results, proponents of greater state attention to issues facing younger people in the housing, education and childcare markets would do well to invoke the threats to the wellbeing of middle-age and older voters' children and grandchildren, and their ability to get on in life and start families of their own without further assistance. However, some older people who are nominally sympathetic to problems facing young people may nevertheless recoil at suggestions that they themselves, as a generation, are culpable for these problems or that they did not face their own struggles. It would seem wise, therefore, to phrase pleas about hardships facing young adults in a non-accusatory tone, and avoid the language of intergenerational warfare or betrayal. The scale of concern about one's younger relatives uncovered in this study, and the impact of these concerns on policy support and vote intention, suggest that the wellbeing of one's family members (as well as the threat to one's own spare bedroom and retirement savings) may be a more productive way of framing discussions about greater state investment in young adults, rather than grand narratives of intergenerational injustice and equity (Duffy 2021; Hutton 2021). In any case, we found no evidence in either our conventional polling or our conjoint experiment that young people have any great appetite for cutting benefits going to pensioners. Because of the importance of family, the generations are emotionally and financially interdependent, and acknowledging this seems to be a good first step in further building up intergenerational consensus on these issues. 'Generational economic warfare' at the ballot box appears to have few takers.

There are, of course, some caveats to our work. It is possible that the pool of voters who are highly concerned for the wellbeing of their younger family members might be reduced somewhat if people see their older family members suffering greater financial hardship in the future. That concern might even be accentuated given that younger generations have some means to improve their circumstances, whereas a pensioner on a very low income without any assets will not (Curtice 2017). However, at least at the time of our survey (or from August 2022), there was relative accuracy in the public's awareness of which generational group is bearing the greatest economic burdens. Current forecasts also predict that poverty rates will be lower among pensioners than children and adults of working age until after the next general election at the very least (Brewer, Fry, and Try 2023: 75). Should this change, however, we would expect concern for older adults to rise. Likewise, we should again note that our research takes place in a political context, post-Covid, where 'cultural' issues of immigration and Brexit (etc.) are much less salient than they were for most of the 2010s (Smith 2022; Sobolewska and Ford 2020). If these issues were to make a sharp return to the top of the public's agenda, this could potentially increase intergenerational animosity as old and young will, once again, be reminded that the 'other side' does not share their values on the bigger issues of the day. Intergenerational altruism and consensus at the ballot box, to some extent, depends on issues relating to national identity and immigration playing second fiddle to those relating to bread-and-butter issues of economic security and state investment.

Overall, and in the current context, sympathetic policy-makers should take heart from our findings. If robust, credible policies targeting young people's living standards and economic opportunities can be designed, there is a bigger audience for them among middle-aged and older adults than is often assumed. Their family's wellbeing depends on it.

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Appendix A: Political Demography in Great Britain

In section 1, we argued that older adults have a political advantage in that, in addition to demographic ageing increasing their size within the population (ONS 2021a, 2021b), they also have higher rates of enfranchisement and turnout than younger voters, and they are more efficiently distributed (i.e. less concentrated) geographically, which reaps a benefit under the UK's first-past-the-post electoral system. Here we explain the evidence for each of these points in turn:

1. **Enfranchisement**. To qualify to vote in a UK general election electoral law, one must be a British, Irish or qualifying Commonwealth citizen (Electoral Commission 2022). Therefore, the vast majority of the UK's residents who are citizens of (say) China, Somalia, or most European Union countries cannot. As noted by Chrisp & Pearce (2019), equating the UK's 'resident population' with the 'potential electorate' is, therefore, problematic, as many residents in the UK cannot actually vote. Given that the age structure of immigrants to the United Kingdom is a lot younger than the population as a whole (Varga-Silva and Rienzo 2020), the median UK resident will almost certainly be significantly younger than the median UK (potential) voter. Accordingly, following a suggestion by Chrisp & Pearce (2019), we attempt to calculate the age of the future UK electorate (rather than UK population) using a combination of ONS population projects (ONS 2021b) and the proportion of UK residents at each year of age with a given nationality, as is recorded for by the Labour Force Survey (LFS). Specifically, we use data from the April-June 2017 wave of the LFS which, unfortunately, was the last edition which provided publically available information on respondents' single country of origin (ONS 2019). Cross-referencing this dataset with the list of resident foreign citizens who are eligible to vote in British general elections (Electoral Commission 2022), we were able to produce an estimate of the proportion of UK residents of a given year of age who are likely to be actually eligible to vote. As expected, this varies dramatically by age. Whilst only 81.5% of 32 year olds sampled were British, Irish or one of the other qualifying nationalities, over 99% of those aged over 80 were. Overall, around 13% of the 18-39 population are non-enfranchised foreign residents, versus around 1% of the over-60s.

Subsequently, we were able to achieve a rough estimate of the future age structure of the electorate by weighting the ONS' projections of the number of UK citizens with a given year of age in 2030, by the proportion of the age group who were actually potentially eligible to vote in 2017.[22] For instance, the ONS estimate that in 2030, 841,805 British residents will be aged 32, this figure was multiplied by 0.815 to get a projected potential electorate of 686,071; in contrast, the projected 503,968 80-year olds received a weight of 0.9942, producing a predicted 501,045 eligible voters.[23] According to British Election Study data (British Election Study 2022), the median age of all eligible voters increased from 44 to 50 between the 1983 and 2019 general elections and, whereas in 1983, 25% of all eligible voters were aged 60 and over, by 2019, 32% were. Our analysis of ONS population projects, once corrected for the age demographics of non-enfranchised residents, indicates that the median eligible voter's age will be around 51 by 2030, and 37% of all potential voters will be aged 60 or above.

2. **Turnout**. The above calculations of the electorate's age rest on the assumption of 100% turnout. As we know, however, many people fail to vote at general elections. Moreover, participation rates are nearly always lower among young adults than the middle-aged and retired (Grasso 2016; Vlandas 2022: 26). British Election Study [BES] data indicates that the over-60s have generally had turnout rates double those of the under-40s since 1997. This is the major reason why, though the median age of an 'eligible voter' in the 2019 general election was 50 (according to the BES), the median age of an actual 'participating voter' that year was 52. Likewise, whereas 32% of 'eligible voters' were 60 or over, 35% of 'participating voters' were.

[22] To keep these projections comparable with the historic data from the British Election Study, we excluded Northern Ireland from all of these calculations.

[23] Like all population projections, these predictions rest on a number of assumptions. In addition to resting on the ONS' own forecast of rates of fertility, mortality, and net migration, my own calculations must assume that the age profile of future immigrants to this country does not depart too heavily from what it looked like in 2017. Furthermore, I am also forced to assume that the specific countries of origin of most UK immigrants does not change too drastically from how things looked in the late-2010s.

To adjust our projections of the electorate's age in 2030, we generated a 'turnout weight' that modifies the projected size of a given age group by how likely it is that voters of a particular age will actually vote in an election, assuming that age inequalities in turnout persist. This turnout weight is simply the average proportion of eligible voters of that age who actually did vote in the three general elections between 2015 and 2019 according to BES data. As the BES provides substantially smaller sample sizes than the Labour Force Survey, average turnout rates were computed for groups of successive five-year age cohorts. That is the estimates of numbers of potential voters aged 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 were weighted using the average rate of turnout for respondents sampled in the BES during 2015-2019 who were aged 18-22 (e.g. 0.55), those aged 78-82 received the average rate for all voters in that age range (e.g. 0.86) etc. For instance, consider that the ONS predict that in 2030 there will be 807,486 resident adults aged 30 in Britain. Of which, using the aforementioned nationality weight for 30-year old Britons (0.8527), we estimate that 688,543 should be eligible to vote (the potential electorate aged 30). However, given that turnout proportion for 28-32 year olds only averaged 0.62 between 2015 and 2019, we predict that only 429,742 of these individuals will be likely to participate in a general election if one were held that year. Accordingly, our analysis of ONS population projects, once corrected for both the age demographics of non-enfranchised residents and age inequalities in turnout, indicates that the median 'participating voter's' age will be around 54 by 2030, and 42% of all participating voters will be aged 60 or above in that year.

3. **Geographic Concentration.** However, even if all foreign residents were enfranchised and youth turnout equalised with that of older voters, the 'over-sixty' electorate would still have a further advantage in their more efficient geographic dispersal, which reaps benefits under the UK's single-member district electoral system. Simply put, younger voters have become increasingly concentrated in a relatively smaller number of constituencies, predominantly found in major cities or university towns. According to our analysis of the ONS' Parliamentary Constituency Population Estimates (ONS 2021c), in 2010, 50% of all 18-39 year-old residents in England and Wales were found in just 37% (i.e. 214/573) of constituencies. By 2019, 50% were found in 36% of constituencies (i.e. 208/573). Older votes are also found

disproportionately in certain areas, such as rural regions and coastal towns, but to a less extreme extent. In 2010, 50% of residents aged 60+ were found in 42% (i.e. 240/573) of constituencies, with the level of concentration only increasing marginally by 2019 (50% in 42% of constituencies, i.e. 238/573).

Assuming present demographic trends, electoral franchise laws, turnout, and the tendency for younger voters to cluster in major cities persist, older voters will continue to have a sizeable political advantage over the under-forties until at least the next decade. This means that understanding their motivations for supporting younger generations will remain a critical research agenda for those interested in British public policy and politics for some time.

Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics

Variable Name	Wording and Coding	Descriptive Statistics (All Adults 18+)
Should Every Generation Have a Higher Standard of Living than the Last?	**Wording:** '*How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? … Every generation should have a higher standard of living than the one that came before it*'. 1. Strongly Disagree 2. Disagree 3. Neither Agree Nor Disagree 4. Agree 5. Strongly Agree 99. Don't Know (Coded as Missing /NA) **Source:** Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.	1. 1.4% 2. 8.0% 3. 34.9% 4. 36.4% 5. 13.9% 99. 5.5% Mean (Non-NA): 3.57 SD (Non-NA): 0.90
Will Your Own Lifetime Living Standards Be Better or Worse than Those of Your Parents?	**Wording:** '*Do you think the standard of living that you will experience throughout your life will be better or worse than the standard of living experienced by your parents?*'. 1. My standard of living will be / will have been a lot worse. 2. My standard of living will be / will have been a little worse. 3. Our standards of living will be / will have been about the same. 4. My standard of living will be / will have been a little better. 5. My standard of living will be / will have been a lot better. 99. Don't Know (Coded as Missing /NA) **Source:** Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.	1. 10.1% 2. 18.8% 3. 20.0% 4. 24.7% 5. 13.3% 99. 13.2% Mean (Non-NA): 3.14 SD (Non-NA): 1.25

Do Today's Younger Generation Have it a Lot Easier than Older Generations Did?	**Wording:** '*How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? … Today's younger generation has it a lot easier than older generations did when they were young*'. 1. Strongly Disagree 2. Disagree 3. Neither Agree Nor Disagree 4. Agree 5. Strongly Agree 99. Don't Know (Coded as Missing /NA) **Source:** Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.	1. 12.8% 2. 23.3% 3. 24.1% 4. 19.1% 5. 16.4% 99. 4.5% Mean (Non-NA): 3.03 SD (Non-NA): 1.29
Does the Younger Generation Not Get its Fair Share of the Nation's Wealth?	**Wording:** '*How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? … The younger generation does not get its fair share of the nation's wealth*'. 1. Strongly Disagree 2. Disagree 3. Neither Agree Nor Disagree 4. Agree 5. Strongly Agree 99. Don't Know (Coded as Missing /NA) **Source:** Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.	1. 12.8% 2. 23.3% 3. 24.1% 4. 19.1% 5. 16.4% 99. 4.5% Mean (Non-NA): 3.03 SD (Non-NA): 1.29

Evaluation of the Financial Wellbeing of All Adults Aged 18-39	**Wording:** '*Giving your best guess, how well do you think that each of the following groups are doing financially, on average? … Young adults in their late teens, twenties and thirties*'. 0. Very Badly 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Very Well 99. Don't Know (Coded as Missing /NA) **Source:** Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.	0. 2.3% 1. 4.7% 2. 10.1% 3. 17.0% 4. 14.3% 5. 14.6% 6. 8.0% 7. 5.9% 8. 2.9% 9. 0.9% 10. 0.6% 99. 18.3% Mean (Non-NA): 4.07 SD (Non-NA): 2.02
Evaluation of the Financial Wellbeing of All Adults Aged 40-59	**Wording:** '*Giving your best guess, how well do you think that each of the following groups are doing financially, on average? … Middle-aged adults in their forties and fifties*'. 0. Very Badly 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Very Well 99. Don't Know (Coded as Missing /NA) **Source:** Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.	0. 0.8% 1. 1.0% 2. 2.2% 3. 4.7% 4. 10.9% 5. 22.5% 6. 19.4% 7. 15.1% 8. 5.4% 9. 1.3% 10. 0.3% 99. 16.5% Mean (Non-NA): 5.46 SD (Non-NA): 1.64

Evaluation of the Financial Wellbeing of All Adults Aged 60+	**Wording:** '*Giving your best guess, how well do you think that each of the following groups are doing financially, on average? … Older adults in their sixties, seventies and over*'. 0. Very Badly 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Very Well 99. Don't Know (Coded as Missing /NA) **Source:** Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.	0. 1.0% 1. 2.3% 2. 3.4% 3. 6.2% 4. 7.7% 5. 14.4% 6. 14.7% 7. 16.6% 8. 11.8% 9. 4.6% 10. 1.4% 99. 16.0% Mean (Non-NA): 5.77 SD (Non-NA): 2.10
Perceived Homeownership Rate: People Aged 18-39	**Wording:** '*Out of every 100 people in their twenties and thirties in Britain today, roughly how many do you think own their own home (including mortgage-holders):* 0. 100. 997. 'Don't Know' (Coded as Missing/ NA) **Source:** Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.	0 – 100. 76.5% 997. 23.5% Mean (Non-NA): 34.85 SD (Non-NA): 19.13 Q1 (Non-NA): 20 Q2 (Non-NA): 30 Q3 (Non-NA): 48 Q4 (Non-NA): 100
Perceived Homeownership Rate: People Aged 60+	**Wording:** '*Out of every 100 people in their sixties, seventies and over in Britain today, roughly how many do you think own their own home (including mortgage-holders):*	0 – 100. 79.1% 997. 20.9%

	0. 100. 997. 'Don't Know' (Coded as Missing / NA) **Source:** Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.	Mean (Non-NA): 69.93 SD (Non-NA): 14.70 Q1 (Non-NA): 61 Q2 (Non-NA): 70 Q3 (Non-NA): 80 Q4 (Non-NA): 100
Have Any Close Relatives Aged 18-39	**Wording:** '*Thinking about your own close family, how well are family members in the following age groups doing financially, on average? If you don't know any close family members in that age group, tick 'Not applicable' …Close family members in their late teens, twenties and thirties*' 0 – 10. 'Very bad – Very good' (coded as = 1, 'has close relatives aged 18-39') 99. 'Not sure / Not applicable, I do not know any family members in that age group' (coded as = 0, 'has no close relatives aged 18-39'. **Source:** Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.	0. 30.3% 1. 69.7% Mean (Non-NA): 0.697 SD (Non-NA): 0.460
Have A Child Aged 18-39	**Wording:** (If indicated that had children (including step-children in a previous question): '*For your *oldest* child, which of the following statements are true? *Tick all that apply*: 1) My child is aged under-18; 2) My child is aged over-40; 3) My child has a degree or is currently attending University; 4) My child owns property in the UK, outright or with a mortgage; …111) None of the above; 99) Don't know*'. A follow-up question asked about 'youngest child' for those with more than 1. Respondents that indicated that they had no children, or that selected the	0. 71.6% 1. 26.6% 99. 1.8% Mean (Non-NA): 0.27 SD (Non-NA): 0.44

	options 1, 2, or 99, in the above question (and the one for a youngest child, if applicable) were coded as = 0 'No Child Aged 18-39'. All others were coded as = 1 'Has Child Aged 18-39'. Those that responded 'Don't Know' to any question were coded as = 99 'missing data'. **Source:** Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.	
Have A Grandchild Aged 18-39	**Wording:** (If indicated that had grandchildren in a previous question): '*Thinking about your grandchild or oldest grandchild if you have more than one, which of the following statements are true? *Tick all that apply* 1) My grandchild is aged under-18; 2) My grandchild is aged over-40; 3) My grandchild has a degree or is currently attending University; 4) My grandchild owns property in the UK, outright or with a mortgage; …111) None of the above; 99) Don't know*'. Respondents that indicated that they had no grandchildren, or that selected the options 1, 2, 111, or 99, in the above question (and the one for a youngest child, if applicable) were coded as = 0 'No Child Aged 18-39'. All others were coded as = 1 'Has Child Aged 18-39'. Those that responded 'Don't Know' to any question were coded as = 99 'missing data'. **Source:** Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.	0. 91.0% 1. 6.8% 99. 2.2% Mean (Non-NA): 0.07 SD (Non-NA): 0.25
Do You Feel a Sense of Belonging to Any of the Following Groups?	**Wording:** '*Do you feel a sense of belonging to any of the following groups? *Please tick all that apply.**: 1. Your Local Community 2. The Middle Class 3. The Working Class 4. Your Ethnic Group 5. Your Generation 6. People of Your Level of Education	1. 23.2% 2. 12.6% 3. 25.0% 4. 10.4% 5. 27.5% 6. 14.9% 7. 62.7%

	7. Your Family 98. None of the Above 99. Don't Know (Coded as Missing / NA) **Source:** Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.	98. 4.5% 99. 6.3%
Are the Living Standards of Your Close Relatives of Utmost Importance?	**Wording:** '*How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? … The living standards of my close family members are of the utmost importance to me*'. 1. Strongly Disagree 2. Disagree 3. Neither Agree Nor Disagree 4. Agree 5. Strongly Agree 99. Don't Know (Coded as Missing / NA) **Source:** Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.	1. 1.6% 2. 3.6% 3. 12.3% 4. 49.7% 5. 19.5% 99. 4.2% Mean (Non-NA): 3.86 SD (Non-NA): 0.84
Evaluation of the Financial Wellbeing of Close Relatives Aged 18-39	**Wording:** '*Thinking about your own close family, **how well are family members in the following age groups doing financially**, on average? If you don't know any close family members in that age group, tick 'Not applicable'….Close family members in their late teens, twenties and thirties*'. 0. Very Badly 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Very Well 99. Not Sure / Not Applicable, I Do Not Know Any Family members in that Age Group (Coded as Missing / NA)	0. 1.4% 1. 2.6% 2. 5.1% 3. 7.6% 4. 9.6% 5. 15.2% 6. 11.5% 7. 8.8% 8. 5.2% 9. 1.7% 10. 1.1% 99. 30.3%

	Source: Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.	Mean (Non-NA): 5.00 SD (Non-NA): 2.11
Evaluation of the Financial Wellbeing of Close Relatives Aged 40-59	**Wording:** '*Thinking about your own close family, **how well are family members in the following age groups doing financially**, on average? If you don't know any close family members in that age group, tick 'Not applicable'....Close family members in their forties and fifties*'. 0. Very Badly 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Very Well 99. Not Sure / Not Applicable, I Do Not Know Any Family members in that Age Group (Coded as Missing / NA) **Source:** Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.	0. 0.7% 1. 1.0% 2. 2.2% 3. 3.5% 4. 6.8% 5. 16.6% 6. 15.3% 7. 13.9% 8. 8.7% 9. 3.0% 10. 1.3% 99. 27.3% Mean (Non-NA): 5.82 SD (Non-NA): 1.86
Evaluation of the Financial Wellbeing of Close Relatives Aged 60+	**Wording:** '*Thinking about your own close family, **how well are family members in the following age groups doing financially**, on average? If you don't know any close family members in that age group, tick 'Not applicable'....Close family members in their sixties, seventies and over*'. 0. Very Badly 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.	0. 0.8% 1. 1.4% 2. 2.5% 3. 3.9% 4. 5.3% 5. 11.7% 6. 11.7% 7. 16.2% 8. 13.6% 9. 6.2%

	8. 9. 10. Very Well 99. Not Sure / Not Applicable, I Do Not Know Any Family members in that Age Group (Coded as Missing / NA) **Source:** Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.	10. 3.0% 99. 23.8% Mean (Non-NA): 6.24 SD (Non-NA): 2.12
Is it Likely that Your Will Have to Give Significant Financial / Practical Assistance to a Young Adult Relative in the Next Decade?	**Wording:** '*During the next 10 years or so, how likely or unlikely is it that you will need to give significant financial or practical assistance to a close family member in their twenties and thirties with childcare or housing needs*'. 1. Very Unlikely 2. Fairly Unlikely 3. Neither Likely Nor Unlikely 4. Fairly Likely 5. Very Likely 99. Don't Know (Coded as Missing / NA) **Source:** Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.	1. 23.8% 2. 19.3% 3. 18.4% 4. 17.1% 5. 7.3% 99. 14.2% Mean (Non-NA): 2.59 SD (Non-NA): 1.31
Support for More Government Spending on Affordable Housing Locally	**Wording:** '*Would you support or oppose increased government spending on the following, **even if it leads to increasing taxes or a reduction of spending elsewhere?...Increasing the amount of affordable housing built in your local area.*'. 1. Strongly Oppose 2. Slightly Oppose 3. Neither Support Nor Oppose 4. Slightly Support 5. Strongly Support 99. Don't Know (Coded as Missing / NA) **Source:** Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.	1. 6.0% 2. 8.8% 3. 22.0% 4. 26.8% 5. 28.6% 99. 7.8% Mean (Non-NA): 3.69 SD (Non-NA): 1.19

Support for More Government Spending on Council Housing Locally	**Wording:** '*Would you support or oppose increased government spending on the following, **even if it leads to increasing taxes or a reduction of spending elsewhere?...Increasing the amount of council housing built in your local area.*'. 1. Strongly Oppose 2. Slightly Oppose 3. Neither Support Nor Oppose 4. Slightly Support 5. Strongly Support 99. Don't Know (Coded as Missing / NA) **Source:** Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.	1. 9.2% 2. 12.4% 3. 23.3% 4. 23.3% 5. 22.8% 99. 9.0% Mean (Non-NA): 3.42 SD (Non-NA): 1.27
Support for More Government Spending on Free University Education	**Wording:** '*Would you support or oppose increased government spending on the following, **even if it leads to increasing taxes or a reduction of spending elsewhere?... Increasing free education for University students.'.* 1. Strongly Oppose 2. Slightly Oppose 3. Neither Support Nor Oppose 4. Slightly Support 5. Strongly Support 99. Don't Know (Coded as Missing / NA) **Source:** Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.	1. 11.4% 2. 13.7% 3. 23.1% 4. 22.0% 5. 21.6% 99. 8.3% Mean (Non-NA): 3.32 SD (Non-NA): 1.31
Support for More Government Spending on Free Vocational-Technical Education	**Wording:** '*Would you support or oppose increased government spending on the following, **even if it leads to increasing taxes or a reduction of spending elsewhere?... Free vocational or technical education for non-University students'.* 1. Strongly Oppose 2. Slightly Oppose 3. Neither Support Nor Oppose 4. Slightly Support	1. 4.3% 2. 6.4% 3. 23.2% 4. 29.7% 5. 26.4% 99. 10.1%

	5. Strongly Support 99. Don't Know (Coded as Missing / NA) **Source:** Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.	Mean (Non-NA): 3.78 SD (Non-NA): 1.08
Support for More Government Spending on Free Childcare for Pre-Schoolers	**Wording:** '*Would you support or oppose increased government spending on the following, **even if it leads to increasing taxes or a reduction of spending elsewhere?... Free childcare for pre-schoolers'.* 1. Strongly Oppose 2. Slightly Oppose 3. Neither Support Nor Oppose 4. Slightly Support 5. Strongly Support 99. Don't Know (Coded as Missing / NA) **Source:** Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.	1. 7.0% 2. 10.5% 3. 24.1% 4. 26.4% 5. 23.1% 99. 8.9% Mean (Non-NA): 3.53 SD (Non-NA): 1.20
Support for Prioritising Spending on the Needs of Older Adults Rather than Younger Adults	**Wording:** '*Some people say that governments should prioritise spending on the needs of younger adults in their late teens, twenties and thirties. Other people say that governments should prioritise spending on the needs of older adults in their sixties, seventies and over. What is your view?*. 0. Government should prioritise spending on younger adults in their late teens, twenties and thirties. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Government should prioritise	0. 2.7% 1. 0.9% 2. 2.8% 3. 5.5% 4. 6.5% 5. 30.2% 6. 8.1% 7. 8.7% 8. 7.0% 9. 2.4% 10. 9.0% 99. 16.1%

	spending on older adults in their sixties, seventies and over. 99. Don't Know (Coded as Missing /NA) **Source:** Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.	Mean (Non-NA): 5.76 SD (Non-NA): 2.34
Policy Prioritisation Task	**Wording:** '*Suppose the government was going to spend more money in three of the following areas. Which would you prioritise? Please select 3.?*. 1. State pensions 2. Free adult social care for the elderly 3. Free public transport for pensioners 4. Winter fuel allowances for pensioners 5. Building more affordable homes 6. Free childcare services for pre-schoolers 7. Free vocational or technical education for non-university students 8. Free education for university students 9. Increasing the amount of new solar/wind/tidal energy projects 10. Investing money in the UK's border force to make it more effective 99. Don't Know (Coded as Missing / NA) **Source:** Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.	1. 44.1% 2. 37.3% 3. 13.5% 4. 27.7% 5. 41.5% 6. 20.1% 7. 19.5% 8. 16.9% 9. 48.3% 10. 20.8% 99. 8.5%
Prioritisation of Education Over Pensions	**Wording:** '*How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? … The government should increase spending on education, even if that means cutting back spending in other areas such as pensions*'. 1. Strongly Disagree 2. Disagree 3. Neither Agree Nor Disagree	1. 10.0%% 2. 28.0% 3. 32.2% 4. 15.2% 5. 5.4%

	4. Agree 5. Strongly Agree 99. Don't Know (Coded as Missing / NA) **Source:** Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.	99. 9.3% Mean (Non-NA): 2.74 SD (Non-NA): 1.04
General Election Vote Intention	**Wording:** '*If there were a general election held tomorrow, which party would you vote for?*. 1. Conservative 2. Labour 3. Liberal Democrat 4. Scottish National Party (SNP) 5. Plaid Cymru 6. Reform UK 7. Green 8. Some Other Party 9. I Would Not Vote 10. Don't Know **Source:** Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.	1. 19.9% 2. 26.4% 3. 6.9% 4. 3.3% 5. 0.6% 6. 2.4% 7. 4.5% 8. 1.5% 9. 12.7% 10. 21.9%
Family Finances Aged 18-39: More Negative	This variable is simply the reverse-coding of the variable 'Evaluation of the Financial Wellbeing of Close Relatives Aged 18-39'. I.e. '0' now indicates that one's close young adult relatives are doing 'very well' and '10' now indicates that they are doing 'very badly'. **Source:** Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.	
Own Financial Outlook: More Negative	This variable the sum of two questions in the May 2022 (Wave 23) edition of the British Election Study Internet Panel: a) '*Now, a few questions about economic conditions. How does the *financial situation of your household* now compare with what it was 12 months ago? Has it:* (1) Got a lot worse; (2) Got a	1. 0.3% 2. 0.5% 3. 2.5% 4. 4.6% 5. 17.3% 6. 12.8%

	little worse; (3) Stayed the same; (4) Got a little better; (5) Got a lot better; (99) Don't Know. *b) 'How do you think the financial situation of your household will change over the next 12 months? Will it:* (1) Get a lot worse; (2) Get a little worse; (3) Stay the same; (4) Get a little better; (5) Get a lot better; (99) Don't Know. 'Don't know' responses were coded as missing data. When summed, these items create a scale running from 2 (household finances 'got a lot worse and will get a lot worse in future') to 10 ('got a lot better and will get a lot better in future'). For consistency with other variables, this scale was then reverse coded and rescaled to run from: 1. Household Finances Got a Lot Better in the Last 12 Months and Will Get a Lot Better in the Next 12 Months 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Household Finances Got a Lot Worse in the Last 12 Months and Will Get a Lot Worse r in the Next 12 Months 99. Don't Know (Coded as Missing / NA). **Source:** British Election Study Internet Panel Wave 23 (May 2022).	7. 27.0% 8. 11.1% 9. 13.4% 99. 10.4% Mean (Non-NA): 6.62 SD (Non-NA): 1.61
National Economic Outlook: More Negative	This variable the sum of two questions in the May 2022 (Wave 23) edition of the British Election Study Internet Panel:	1. 0.1% 2. 0.2%

	a) ‘*Now, a few questions about economic conditions. How does the *general economic situation in this country* now compare with what it was 12 months ago? Has it: (1) Got a lot worse; (2) Got a little worse; (3) Stayed the same; (4) Got a little better; (5) Got a lot better; (99) Don’t Know.* b) ‘*How do you think the general economic situation in this country will change over the next 12 months? Will it: (1) Get a lot worse; (2) Get a little worse; (3) Stay the same; (4) Get a little better; (5) Get a lot better; (99) Don’t Know.* ‘Don’t know’ responses were coded as missing data. When summed, these items create a scale running from 2 (national economy ‘got a lot worse and will get a lot worse in future’) to 10 (‘got a lot better and will get a lot better in future’). For consistency with other variables, this scale was then reverse coded and rescaled to run from: 1. National Economy Got a Lot Better in the Last 12 Months and Will Get a Lot Better in the Next 12 Months 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. National Economy Got a Lot Worse in the Last 12 Months and Will Get a Lot Worse r in the Next 12 Months	3. 0.9% 4. 1.2% 5. 5.1% 6. 5.6% 7. 19.1% 8. 17.8% 9. 39.4% 99. 10.6% Mean (Non-NA): 7.85 SD (Non-NA): 1.37

	99. Don't Know (Coded as Missing / NA). **Source:** British Election Study Internet Panel Wave 23 (May 2022).	
2016 EU Referendum Vote	**Wording:** '*In the Referendum in 2016 on whether Britain should remain in or leave the European Union, which way did you vote, or did you not vote?*' 1. I Voted to Remain 2. I Voted to Leave 3. I Did Not Vote 4. Can't Remember **Source:** British Election Study Internet Panel Wave 23 (May 2022).	1. 37.2% 2. 39.4% 3. 23.2% 4. 0.2%
Age	Respondents' age in years (18-96). **Source:** Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.	Mean (Non-NA): 49.6 SD (Non-NA): 17.0 Q1 (Non-NA): 37 Q2 (Non-NA): 49 Q3 (Non-NA): 64 Q4 (Non-NA): 96
Gender	Respondents' gender. 0. Male 1. Female	0. 48.6% 1. 51.4% Mean (Non-NA): 0.51 SD (Non-NA): 0.50

Education	Respondent's highest level of education. Dichotomised to indicate whether or not the respondent had a university degree (or equivalent) or not. Coded as: 0. Non-University Graduate 1. University Graduate (Degree) Highest educational qualification data was recorded in August 2022 Original YouGov Survey. Those with nursing or teaching qualifications, a university or CNAA first or higher degree were classified as graduates. 150 cases (3.4% of sample) initially had no valid information on their educational attainment. For 49 of these cases, equivalent data from the May 2022 British Election Study Internet Panel [BESIP] (Wave 23) was used instead. The remaining 101 cases (2.3% of sample) were assigned a value based on a question in the May 2022 BESIP that asked whether they had ever attended a university or any other higher education institute. All those who had and said they had graduated from such an institute were classified as university graduates. **Source:** Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.	0. 67.4% 1. 32.6% Mean (Non-NA): 0.33 SD (Non-NA): 0.47
Logged Equivalised HH Income	The logged value of the respondent's gross household income, equivalised for household size and composition based on the OECD equivalence scale. Gross household income was recorded (in terms of 15 intervals) in the August 2022 Original YouGov Survey. 1,112 respondents (25% of our sample) failed to answer this question. 38 of these missing responses were filled using data from an identical question in the May 2022 BESIP. A further 200 missing responses had their household	Mean (Non-NA): 9.78 SD (Non-NA): 0.75 Q1 (Non-NA): 9.37 Q2 (Non-NA): 9.82 Q3 (Non-NA): 10.33 Q4 (Non-NA): 11.92

	incomes imputed based on the median income for their NS-SEC Occupational Class combined with their Employment Status and Gender. E.g. the median for retired, male, higher professionals, or for full-time, female, routine employees etc. The remaining 874 missing responses comprised of those who also gave no last occupation on the NS-SEC Occupational Class question. They were assigned the median income value for those of their level of education (degree or no degree), work status and gender. E.g. the median for male, full-time employees with a degree or for female part-time employees with no degree etc. Following this, the respondent's household income (recoded as the middle value of their selected interval, e.g. 2500 for those who selected the interval £0 - £4,999) was then equivalised for the size and composition of their household based on the OECD equivalence scale. That is, their income is divided by their household's equivalent size'. This is the sum of any adults and children in the household, after each person has been assigned a specific weight. The first adult is weighted as 1, with the second and subsequent adults being weighted as 0.5. In the OECD measure, children under 14 are given a weight of 0.3, but here we weight all those under 18 as 0.3 due to limitations in the available data. These totals are then summed to give the equivalence weight, and then the total household income is then divided by this amount. E.g. a household of 2 adults and 3 children with a gross income of £50,000 has an equivalised household income of £20,833.33. I.e. ((50000) / ((1* 1) + (1 * 0.5) + (3 * 0.3))) = 50000 / 2.4 = 20,833.33.	

	Note that 194 respondents (4.4% of the sample) gave no information on their household size and so were assigned the median equivalence weight of 1.5. Finally, to deal with a substantial skewness value (2.2), the variable was then logged. **Source:** Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.	
Employment Status	1. Working Full-Time (30 Hours a Week+) 2. Working Part-Time (<30 Hours a Week) 3. Retired 4. Unemployed 5. Other Out of Labour Market (e.g. Student, Housewife, Raising Children, Other etc.) **Source:** Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.	1. 41.7% 2. 14.2% 3. 24.7% 4. 4.3% 5. 15.1%
Housing Tenure & House Value Tercile	A categorical variable distinguishing between non-homeowners, mortgage holders, and those who own their property out-right. Among the latter group, respondents are also distinguished depending on whether the value of their property is in the bottom, middle, or top third of our sample by value. 'Non-owners' classified as those who were renting their home or lived with their parents, family or friends or elsewhere without owning. 'Own with a mortgage' encapsulated those who said they owned with a mortgage or only part-owned via a share ownership scheme. 'Owners' were those who 'owned outright'. We then divided this latter group into three terciles based on the value of their property as approximated by the respondent in comparison to the rest of the sample of homeowners. 279 homeowners (6% of the sample) failed to approximate a	1. 39.5% 2. 28.4% 3. 13.2% 4. 11.3% 5. 7.7%

<table>
<tr><td></td><td>value, and so were assigned the median value for their region. Accordingly the variable had the values:

1. Non-Owner
2. Own with a Mortgage
3. Own – Bottom 1/3rd Value (< £249,999)
4. Own – Middle 1/3rd Value (£250k - £399,999)
5. Own – Top 1/3rd Value (£400,000+)

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel Wave 23 (May 2022).</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>Region</td><td>The region in Britain in which the respondent lives. Coded as:
1. Northern England
2. Midlands England
3. Southern England (exc. London)
4. London
5. Wales
6. Scotland

Source: Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.</td><td>1. 24.1%
2. 16.6%
3. 33.6%
4. 12.0%
5. 5.1%
6. 8.6%</td></tr>
<tr><td>Occupational Class</td><td>Recorded in May 2022 BESIP (Wave 23). Organisers of the BESIP asked respondents for their most recent (or current) occupation. These responses were then coded into a schema based on Britain's official National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC). This schema distinguishes: 1) Employers in large organisations and higher managers; 2) Higher professionals; 3) Lower professionals and junior managers; 4) Intermediate occupation employees; 5) Self-employed and small businesspeople; 6) lower supervisors and technical workers; 7) Semi-routine occupation workers; 8) Routine occupation workers. See here for more information on the schema. 823 cases (18.5%) had missing data on this variable. These tended to be, disproportionately, older</td><td>1. 1.6%
2. 9.1%
3. 21.9%
4. 17.1%
5. 4.8%
6. 5.0%
7. 8.4%
8. 5.9%
9. 17.6%
10. 8.6%</td></tr>
</table>

	women, who may have genuinely had limited formal employment history after marriage. To avoid dropping these cases entirely, two further categories were added on to the end of this variable which distinguished between those in and out of full-time work: 9) NA – But not in Employment; 10) NA – But in FT Employment. Accordingly: 1. Employers in Large Organisations and Higher Mangers 2. Higher Professionals 3. Lower Professionals and Managers 4. Intermediate Occupations 5. Employers in Small Organisations and Own Account Workers 6. Lower Supervisory and Technical Occupations 7. Semi-Routine Occupations 8. Routine Occupations 9. NA – Not in FT Employment 10. NA – FT Worker **Source:** British Election Study Internet Panel Wave 23 (May 2022).	

Appendix C: Vote Choice Full Regression Model

See the table below for the multinomial models that produced the coefficients used in Figure 20 of the main text. The models show the predictors of an intended vote for the Labour Party rather than the Conservatives at the time of our August 2022 survey. We present results for middle-aged (40-59) and older (60+) respondents separately. We also present the results from both 'bivariate' regressions (i.e. no control variables) and 'multivariable' models that simultaneously control for all the other variables listed in the models. Our models also allowed for a vote intention for 'all other opposition parties' (i.e. Liberal Democrat, Scottish National Party, Brexit Party etc.) but, for reasons of space, these coefficients are not displayed here. Believing that one's younger relatives were doing worse financially was also associated with a vote intention for other opposition parties among middle-aged voters (but not older voters), albeit not as strongly as was associated with Labour support.

Table C1: Predictors of Support for the Opposition Labour Party (1) Rather than the Incumbent Conservative Party (0), Among Respondents Aged 40-59 and 60+ (*Coefficients used to produce Figure 20 in the main text*)

	Respondents Aged 40-59		**Respondents Aged 60+**	
	Bivariate Models	Multivariable Model	Bivariate Models	Multivariable Model
Finances Family Aged 18-39: More Negative (0-10)	**0.20 (0.04)** **	**0.13 (0.05)** **	**0.17 (0.04)** **	**0.09 (0.04)** *
Own Financial Outlook: More Negative (1-9)	**0.32 (0.05)** **	0.07 (0.08)	**0.40 (0.05)** **	0.05 (0.07)
National Economic Outlook: More Negative (1-9)	**0.59 (0.07)** **	**0.48 (0.10)** **	**0.92 (0.08)** **	**0.83 (0.11)** **
2016 EU Referendum Vote				
Voted Leave	**- 1.58 (0.15)** **	**- 1.48 (0.22)** **	**- 2.01 (0.14)** **	**- 2.10 (0.20)** **
Did Not Vote	**- 0.56 (0.27)** *	- 0.40 (0.41)	- 0.54 (0.33)	**- 0.86 (0.42)** *
Don't Know How Voted	**- 1.75 (0.60)** **	- 1.59 (1.06)	**- 1.81 (0.69)** **	**- 2.08 (0.83)** *
(*Ref: Voted Remain*)				
Age (Decades)	**- 0.38 (0.12)** **	- 0.33 (0.18)	**- 0.58 (0.10)** **	**- 0.36 (0.16)** *
Gender				
Female	**0.38 (0.14)** **	0.27 (0.21)	**0.35 (0.12)** **	0.33 (0.18)
Education				
University Graduate	0.18 (0.14)	- 0.04 (0.22)	**0.68 (0.14)** **	**0.52 (0.21)** *
Logged Equivalised HH Income	**- 0.25 (0.09)** **	- 0.31 (0.17)	- 0.04 (0.11)	0.12 (0.18)
Employment Status				
Part-Time Worker	- 0.07 (0.20)	- 0.14 (0.31)	0.12 (0.28)	0.08 (0.45)
Retired	**- 0.95 (0.38)** *	- 0.20 (0.60)	- 0.44 (0.23)	- 0.25 (0.40)
Unemployed	0.64 (0.37)	0.67 (0.58)	0.42 (0.65)	- 0.32 (0.89)
Other out of Labour Market	**0.39 (0.20)** *	0.52 (0.32)	**0.72 (0.35)** *	0.62 (0.49)
(Ref: Full-Time Worker)				
Housing Tenure & House Value Tercile				
Own with Mortgage	- 0.15 (0.16)	- 0.00 (0.25)	- 0.15 (0.24)	**- 0.75 (0.32)** *
Owner – 1st Tercile House Value	- 0.47 (0.26)	- 0.19 (0.39)	**- 0.54 (0.18)** **	**- 0.78 (0.26)** **
Owner – 2nd Tercile House Value	**- 0.90 (0.27)** **	- 0.68 (0.44)	**- 0.73 (0.18)** **	**- 0.92 (0.28)** **
Owner – 3rd Tercile House Value	**- 1.24 (0.32)** **	**- 1.05 (0.47)** *	**- 0.81 (0.20)** **	**- 1.16 (0.30)** **
(Ref: Non-Owner)				
Region				
Northern England	0.26 (0.25)	0.37 (0.35)	**- 0.64 (0.23)** **	- 0.25 (0.32)
Midlands England	**- 0.67 (0.26)** **	- 0.43 (0.37)	**- 0.93 (0.25)** **	- 0.13 (0.35)
Southern England (exc. London)	**- 0.70 (0.23)** **	- 0.34 (0.33)	**- 1.35 (0.23)** **	**- 0.96 (0.30)** **
Wales	0.16 (0.40)	0.27 (0.53)	- 0.33 (0.31)	- 0.26 (0.41)
Scotland	- 0.04 (0.34)	0.21 (0.55)	**- 0.88 (0.32)** **	- 1.12 (0.50)
(Ref: London)				
Occupational Class				
Higher Professionals	0.88 (0.49)	**1.35 (0.59)** *	- 0.06 (0.44)	- 0.19 (0.72)
Lower Professionals	**1.30 (0.47)** **	**1.49 (0.60)** *	- 0.14 (0.41)	- 0.72 (0.67)
Intermediate Occupations	**1.11 (0.47)** *	1.20 (0.61)	- 0.21 (0.42)	- 0.58 (0.69)
Employers in Small Orgs + Own Account	0.63 (0.54)	**1.47 (0.72)** *	- 0.71 (0.46)	- 0.97 (0.74)
Lower Supervisory and Technical Workers	0.35 (0.53)	1.06 (0.69)	- 0.66 (0.48)	- 0.84 (0.77)
Semi-Routine Workers	**1.26 (0.51)** *	**1.62 (0.67)** *	- 0.27 (0.44)	- 0.59 (0.75)
Routine Workers	0.36 (0.55)	0.85 (0.70)	0.34 (0.47)	- 0.01 (0.78)
NA – But not in FT Employment	**1.68 (0.52)** **	1.28 (0.74)	- 0.25 (0.42)	- 0.55 (0.69)
NA – But in FT Employment	**1.26 (0.50)** *	**1.68 (0.65)** *	- 0.84 (0.72)	- 2.13 (1.08)
(Ref: Employers and Managers in Large Orgs)				
Constant	- 0.68 (0.22)	- 0.31 (2.23)	- 1.18 (0.18)	- 1.26 (2.51)
N	**971**	**913**	**1,162**	**1,116**

** = p < 0.05; ** = p <0.01*

Source: INTERGENPOL-GB Survey (August 2022).
Note: Multinomial logit models (logit coefficients). DV = Vote Intention: (1) Conservative Party (*reference*); (2) Labour Party; (3) Other Opposition Parties. Note: Only Conservative v Labour comparisons are displayed above. Constant and N refer to the bivariate model for the 'Finances Family Aged 18-39' variable. These coefficients for the 'Finances Family Aged 18-39' were used to produce Figure 20.

Appendix D: Supplementary Conjoint Experiment Analyses

Figure D1: *Conjoint Experiment of Government Spending Preferences: Younger v Middle-Aged Adults*



Source: Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.

Note: As Figure 23, but for younger (18-39) and middle-aged (40-59) respondents. N = 1,563 people aged 18-39 and 2,272 people aged 60 and over. Middle-aged adults appear to be roughly half way between younger adults and where older adults (60+) were in Figure 23. That said, they appear notably less put-off by promises to further increase investment in university education (being ambivalent or mildly positive instead), and more enthusiastic about increasing affordable housing in general rather than affordable housing for first time buyers in particular.

Figure D2: Conjoint Experiment of Government Spending Preferences: Older Adults With and Without Financially Struggling Young Adult Relatives



Source: Intergenpol-GB Survey, August 2022.

Note: As with Figure 23, but this plot uses data from only those people aged 60 and over, distinguishing between people of that group with financially struggling young relatives (i.e. those who rated the financial wellbeing of their relatives aged 18-39 as less than a 5/10) and those without (i.e. those who rated the financial wellbeing of relatives aged 18-39 as 5/10 and above, or who have no relatives that age at all). Whilst differences are small, older adults with financially struggling relatives do seem to be noticeably more in favour of spending more on vocational and technical education, and seem more likely to oppose spending less on support for university students. This validates some of the results from our conventional survey data. N = 422 people aged 60 and over with financially struggling young adult relatives and 1,133 people aged 60 and over without financially struggling young adult relatives.